Thursday, August 13, 2020

Health policy and debate misfire: how private corporations, non-profits, medical professionals and government health bureaucracies colonise our ill-health

We have an epidemic of evolutionary novelty, and it is killing us.
Bret Weinstein

Health policy is a matter of lively debate in the US, largely because the US political system has never fully settled on a coherent health system.

Health as a policy issue has all the factors that make for difficult public policy. It really matters to people. There are deep information asymmetries (lots of folk do not know what they need to know and have to rely on others). It can be ferociously expensive. Both public and private provision have obvious problems that the partisans of the other can point to. Lots of people’s incomes are at stake.

Something of a perfect storm of difficulties.

Health issues can be divided into acute (infections, accidents, violence) and chronic (everything else).

Western medicine is generally very good at dealing with acute conditions. Acute conditions have clear indicators of success; they are an immediate, identifiable problem; they fit in with the anatomical foundations of Western medicine; and there is a very broad incentive to get it right. There is certainly grounds for debate about how best to provide and fund acute care. Nevertheless, acute medicine is mostly a relatively straightforward provision-and-insurance problem.

If acute care was split off and dealt with specifically, I strongly suspect reasonable mechanisms with good incentives could be agreed on fairly easily. Mainly because the inherent incentives in acute care are success-oriented.

Chronic conditions are a very different matter. Western medicine has been far less successful at dealing with chronic conditions. Cancer is still often a death sentence and the metabolic health of Western populations (obesity, high blood pressure, diabetes, etc) has been steadily getting worse for decades.

Moreover, as noted here, most of those chronic conditions are related to the mismatch between how we evolved to live and how we do live.

Health expenditure has been consuming ever higher shares of GDP. There is a view that it is perfectly natural that health expenditure should go up. As people get richer, they want to fund better health, they live longer, so of course health expenditure goes up.

I want to suggest that is (mostly) bollocks. As we get richer and more knowledgeable, it should be easier to achieve and maintain good health. We should not be getting chronically sicker, which we are. Health expenditure is going up far more because we are getting chronically sicker than because of some preference for better health or the experience of increased longevity.

Incentives matter

Looked at dispassionately, the reason for the increasing chronic ill-health of Western populations is simple. That is precisely what the current incentives are structured to produce.

Start with Big Food Products. Their incentive is not to provide nutrition, their incentive is to get you to eat more. Since what you eat affects how much you eat, and because palatability and nutritional value are so weakly connected, getting us to eat more is both relatively easy and immensely profitable. If we eat more and more, if we eat more and more of what is palatable but not metabolically healthy, thereby increasing our metabolic stress, we will get more and more metabolically unhealthy. Which we are. But we will eat a lot more of Big Food Products’s multi-billion dollar income-earning offerings on our way.

People will do more of what makes their income go up. People are paid to do more of what makes their income to go up.

Consider Big Pharma. Their incentive is far more to provide suppression of symptoms than it is to provide cures. A genuine cure — you take this, the problem goes away, so you can stop taking this — is much less profitable than suppression of symptoms. For instance, tablets for high blood pressure do not cure what causes the high blood pressure, they suppress the symptoms. An amazing amount of prescriptions are not curative, they merely suppress symptoms.

People will do more of what makes their income go up. People are paid to do more of what makes their income to go up.

Consider health advocacy. The dominant donors for health advocacy non-profits such as heart associations, diabetes associations, and so on are Big Pharma and Big Food Products. Moreover, if those conditions actually went away, if they became insignificant, then so would the point of having those non-profit associations and the jobs they fund.

People will do more of what makes their income go up. People are paid to do more of what makes their income to go up.

Consider Official Psychiatry. What distinguishes psychiatrists from clinical psychologists is that psychiatrists can prescribe drugs. (And clinical psychology is more likely to have a stronger base in actual scientific evidence.) So, psychiatrists have a strong incentive to focus on the prescription of drugs.

Psychiatric drugs are almost invariably not curative. You generally do not take them, get cured by the drug, and stop taking them. We do not know enough about the interaction between neurophysiology, neurochemistry and cognitive patterns to reliably produce curative psychiatric drugs.

Psychiatric drugs typically suppress symptoms. Which means that they are often used much longer than an actual cure would be. Indeed, it is often not clear that they are any better than, and may be worse than, the passage of time. (They may be worse than the passage of time because of the possibility that they could be suppressing curative responses that might occur if things were allowed to run.) But suppression of symptoms can easily provide a more secure stream of income than an actual cure. With failing to ask awkward questions, or consider awkward data, being very successful income-and-authority self-defence devices.

People will do more of what makes their income go up. People are paid to do more of what makes their income to go up.

As an aside, and on a somewhat related issue, in the US, gender-affirming therapy plus the Dutch medical application model is the basis for treating gender dysphoria. This maximises the chance that anyone presenting with gender dysphoria will be medicalised and so become a permanent consumer of artificial hormones, with the more income to be made the earlier in life people transition. The gender-affirming medicalisation approach has been endorsed by various peak medical bodies, bypassing normal interrogation of the scientific evidence. (Once a viewpoint gets enough “this is what good people believe” oomph behind it, it can memetically capture institutions remarkably quickly, particularly if dissent is sanctioned.)

Getting back to chronic conditions in general, general practitioners, your ordinary medicos, are in much the same situation as psychiatrists. Suppression of symptoms can easily provide a more secure stream of income than an actual cure. With failing to ask awkward questions, or consider awkward data, being very successful income-and-authority self-defence devices.

Stop and consider what doctors in the past were paid to deliver as “cures”. It is clearly entirely possible to sustain a medical profession on a very poor knowledge base. Let alone a system that does successfully suppress symptoms, at least to a degree, and for significant amounts of time.

People will do more of what makes their income go up. People are paid to do more of what makes their income to go up.

Consider government health bureaucracies. Notionally, they spend money to improve the health of the populace. In reality, their revenue goes up the chronically sicker the populace gets. The behaviour that is selectively rewarded, by increasing their budgets, is behaviour that generates (or at least does not seriously stop) the populace getting chronically sicker.

Hence we see nutrition guidelines that have not been, and are not, grounded in the science, that make no evolutionary sense (our foraging ancestors did not eat breakfast, did not eat frequently during the day, did not eat much in the way of whole grains, did not eat seed oils and definitely ate a fair bit of fat) but do lead to a chronically sicker population, so increased government health budgets and larger health bureaucracies.

People will do more of what makes their income go up. People are paid to do more of what makes their income to go up.

It is striking how pervasive the effect of the official nutritional guidelines are. They affect all food provided by government agencies — including thereby undermining the metabolic health and capacity of armed service personnel — determine nutritional content of medical training and advice provided from large medical practises.

It is not that there is some malicious conspiracy to preside over ill-health. Instead, social selection processes operate, where access to income flows are what is being selected for. The incentives are to go with the income flows. They are certainly not to have less income.

Especially when huge sums are at stake, as they are, selection will be for ideas that are good at generating income, rather than selecting for truth or scientific accuracy.

To understand how dire the issue of nutrition is, consider this: calories in, calories out. This is at once an obviously true mantra — we have to be in calorie deficit to lose weight — and yet is so profoundly misleading as to effectively be a lie.

For here’s the thing: what we eat affects how much we eat, how much we move and how active our metabolism is. Calories are not remotely equal. There are essential proteins. There are essential fats. There are no essential carbohydrates. With enough fat and protein, your body will make all the glucose it needs. Any nutritional guidelines that encourage you to eat frequently, and to eat lots of carbohydrates, are encouraging you to eat more and to, for most people, metabolically stress your body.

Why would government health bureaucracies produce such nutrition guidelines? Consider what increases health expenditures and who has the most incentive to lobby hardest. Do not delude yourself that they are well-grounded in the scientific evidence, which is a difficult matter in nutrition, making it easier to select for convenient agendas and to maintain policy inertia.

Colonising ill-health

The calories in, calories out, mantra goes with “people are getting obese because we are getting greedier and lazier”. Apparently, something magical happen a few decades ago to destroy people’s culinary moral fibre. This is not an explanation, it is a justification for colonising people’s ill-health.

Consider that what you eat affects how much you eat, how much you move and how active our metabolism is. Consider that rising obesity, and other signs of metabolic disorder, coincide with the adoption of modern processed foods (with lots of seed oils). And then look again at the “greedy and lazy” pseudo-explanation. (At this point, anger is a reasonable reaction.)

Colonisers always claim that they are there, and that they are justified, because of the “problems” and “deficiencies” of the colonised.

We have an entire interlocking set of industries and professions that colonise people’s ill-health far more than they provide genuine cures. And the “greedy and lazy” explanation of obesity blames the victims for their profitable exploitation by those — corporations, non-profits and government bureaucracies — that are colonising our collective ill-health.

Who makes money from people eating less, eating less frequently, and perhaps fasting beneficially? Who makes money from the opposite? And how much?

People will do more of what makes their income go up. People are paid to do more of what makes their income to go up.

Another factor is that the anatomical-structure focus of Western medicine may be not well structured to deal with conditions that are far more about energy flows, about the energetics of the body, rather than its structures per se. Though to have so many incentives working for suppression (or even generation of) symptoms, rather than actual cures, hardly encourages adopting a more effective analytical paradigm. Hence the continuing scandal of the lack of serious nutritional training for doctors.

As has been observed, you take an animal to the vet and the vet will ask you what you have been feeding your pet. You go to your doctor, they are not likely to ask what you have been eating. If they do, there is a high probability they will not be asking from a knowledge base grounded in solid science. (A depressing amount of what passes for nutrition ‘science’ is of remarkably low scientific quality: associational studies in particular have a startling failure rate.)

What all this comes down to is Western populations getting chronically sicker and the budgetary burden of heath expenditures getting progressively worse. Because that is what the incentive structure of Big Food Products, Big Pharma, health advocacy, Official Psychiatry, standard medical practice and Big Health Bureaucracy are all structured to produce. They are structured to colonise our (increasing) mental and physical ill-health far more than providing good nutritional practices or actual cures. (Good nutritional practices and cure may often amount to the same thing.) With the flow of funds from corporations to research, advocacy groups and doctors aggravating the problems

So, where acute care is a relatively straightforward provision-and-insurance problem with generally pro-social incentives, chronic conditions are a profoundly dysfunctional mess that no system of provision will do more than generate ever higher expenditures, so long as that continues to be what the incentives structures are overwhelmingly set up to create.

The endless, deeply ideological, arguments (better characterised as memetic warfare) over public versus private provision in health are just arguments over how much private or public bodies will colonise the chronic ill-health of Western populations. Whether they will do so is not currently in dispute.

(And I agree, private providers will colonise our ill-health more efficiently and with more charm. They have to work harder than government bodies, colonisation generally being easier if folk are coerced into providing the income flow.)

Can anyone, in all the sound and fury over health policy, direct me to anything that suggest policy makers have even asked the right questions? Because if they have not even asked the right questions, how can we expect good answers?

But, then again, who has the incentives to ask the right questions?

Voices from the collapse of mainstream media

The ideas that catch on are the ones that win in narrative warfare. … That rivalrous game-theoretic environment is going to be selecting for what is effective, not what is true. And definitely not what is good for the whole.
Daniel Schmatchenberger


There is a mantra about of “go woke, go broke”. But Jessie Singal has suggested that in media, it is more “go broke, go woke” as the collapse of standard media business models makes it harder to sustain diversity of thought. He made the point in a Rebel Wisdom discussion.

The recent resignation of Arian Pekary from MSNBC speaks to Singal’s point:

But behind closed doors, industry leaders will admit the damage that’s being done.

“We are a cancer and there is no cure,” a successful and insightful TV veteran said to me. “But if you could find a cure, it would change the world.”

As it is, this cancer stokes national division, even in the middle of a civil rights crisis. The model blocks diversity of thought and content because the networks have incentive to amplify fringe voices and events, at the expense of others… all because it pumps up the ratings.

See also her follow up post on how Fox is also narrative driven.

Columnist Barbara Kay’s resignation from the National Post in Canada speaks on the conformity pressures now operating:

Since the early 2000s, journalists have anticipated the demise of their own industry. But we wrongly assumed that this decline would be driven exclusively by economic and technological factors. In recent months especially, it’s become clear that ideological purges have turned a gradual retreat into what now feels like a full-on rout. This is not a case of a lack of demand: The rise of popular new online sites shows that Canadians are eager for fresh voices and good reporting. Rather, legacy outlets are collapsing from within because they’ve outsourced editorial direction to a vocal internal minority that systematically weaponizes social media to destroy internal workplace hierarchies, and which presents its demands in Manichean terms. During the various iterations of political correctness that appeared since the 1990s, National Post editors fought against this trend. But as the public shaming of Rex Murphy shows, some now feel they have no choice but to throw down their weapons and sue for peace.

Bari Weiss’s resignation from the New York Times has been the most famous recent instance of conformity pressures leading to public exit.

Twitter is not on the masthead of The New York Times. But Twitter has become its ultimate editor. As the ethics and mores of that platform have become those of the paper, the paper itself has increasingly become a kind of performance space. Stories are chosen and told in a way to satisfy the narrowest of audiences, rather than to allow a curious public to read about the world and then draw their own conclusions. I was always taught that journalists were charged with writing the first rough draft of history. Now, history itself is one more ephemeral thing molded to fit the needs of a predetermined narrative.

My own forays into Wrongthink have made me the subject of constant bullying by colleagues who disagree with my views.


Andrew Sullivan made similar points in his last column for New York magazine:

What has happened, I think, is relatively simple: A critical mass of the staff and management at New York Magazine and Vox Media no longer want to associate with me, and, in a time of ever tightening budgets, I’m a luxury item they don’t want to afford. And that’s entirely their prerogative. They seem to believe, and this is increasingly the orthodoxy in mainstream media, that any writer not actively committed to critical theory in questions of race, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity is actively, physically harming co-workers merely by existing in the same virtual space. Actually attacking, and even mocking, critical theory’s ideas and methods, as I have done continually in this space, is therefore out of sync with the values of Vox Media. That, to the best of my understanding, is why I’m out of here.

Matt Taibbi has reported on the general pattern:

Today no one with a salary will stand up for colleagues like Lee Fang. Our brave truth-tellers make great shows of shaking fists at our parody president, but not one of them will talk honestly about the fear running through their own newsrooms. People depend on us to tell them what we see, not what we think. What good are we if we’re afraid to do it?

Documentary film maker Christopher Rufo has recently described the process operating in his part of the media world:

I saw the ideology coming in, in a heavy way, about five years ago where the whole documentary industry was really kind of conforming to identity politics, the structure of identity politics and the reward system of identity politics. … making niche films that have no broad audience and which only please the activist gatekeepers. …

The accepted discourse was quite narrow … The economy of the documentary world is explicitly, and now almost solely, predicated on identity issues. …

I realised quickly that this [conference] was not a place for dialogue, this was a place for kind of sermonising.

Heather Heying, in a recent Dark Horse podcast, where she and her husband Bret Weinstein report on what is happening in Portland, specifically mourns Harper’s going with the standard trend of not-reporting the narrative-inconvenient bits of what is happening in Portland (peaceful protests in the day, riots at night). Not sure which podcast it was now, but this excerpt from a recent podcast provides eye-witness discussion.

But they saw the exclusion/inclusion patterns of narrative-driven media back in 2017 when the New York Times and similar media would not report (or not accurately) what was going on in Evergreen College because it was narrative-inconvenient but Fox and the Wall St Journal would report on it (and generally accurately) because it was narrative-convenient for them.

Jesse Singal, Matt Taibbi, Heather Heying, Bret Weinstein, Arian Pekary. These are not remotely right wing or conservative folk.

Jessie Singal’s “go broke, go woke” comment seems pretty spot on.

This is institutional rot. Going on right in front of us.

Tuesday, August 4, 2020

The Desperate Need to put Umpires Back Into the US System of Government

The American Republic is a political system run without umpires. The Presidents and Governors are elected, highly partisan officials. The Speaker of the US House of Representatives, and the equivalent presiding officers of the State legislatures, are highly partisan figures. As the increasingly existential struggles over Supreme Court nominations show, American judges are also partisan figures, though not quite as blatantly.

The American political order has only partisan figures at its centre. There is no institutional figure or authority that is not inherently political and cannot become consumed by processes of political polarisation. There are no umpires.

How has running a political system without umpires worked? Fairly badly. 72 years after the US Constitution came into operation in 1789, the United States were the disunited States, fighting a bitter civil war. 155 years after the end of that civil war, the American Republic is drifting towards another civil war. This is not an impressive record.

Moreover, even with this record, the United States is a relatively successful presidential republic. The overall track record of presidential republics is not impressive.

Fortunately, there is a straightforward solution to the lack of umpires problem. Become a Parliamentary Republic. This could be done very simply.

First, have the President elected by two-thirds vote of the Congress, in a secret ballot. Have the State Governors elected by two-thirds vote of their Legislatures, in a secret ballot. If two-thirds is not broad enough, make it a three-quarters vote.

Second, create an Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council would be the President or Governor, the Majority Leader of the lower house of the Congress or State legislature and such members of Congress or State legislature as the Majority Leader shall recommend. Require all acts of the President or Governor to be done on the advice of the Executive Council except such reserve powers that are necessary for the maintenance of responsible government. (There is a rich common law tradition of reserve powers: I am sure that US lawyers will be able to cope.)

Third, require all Cabinet officers to be members of the Congress or State Legislature.

Fourth, require all regulations be approved by the relevant committee of the Senate or Upper House of the State Legislature before they can have legal force. But permit the Executive Council to remove any regulation at any time.

This fourth element is not necessary to become a Parliamentary Republic, but it is required to bring some reasonable level of accountability to the administrative state. It would also be easy to systematically go through and remove existing regulations, forcing regulatory bodies to get direct legislative approval for any re-issuing of said regulations.

The US would, by these simple constitutional changes, be turned into a Parliamentary Republic. The President and Governors would become symbols of authority without having substantial power. The Power and the Glory would thereby be separated, one of the great virtues of constitutional monarchy. A virtue that Parliamentary republics can also manage.

Umpires would also thereby be inserted into the political system. Even better, the notion of umpires would be inserted into the political system. At the ceremonial heart of politics would be a non-political office.

Moreover, a Parliamentary state can be a thoroughly effective Great Power. Britain conquered about a quarter of the globe as a Parliamentary state.

The US notion of executive Governors was a quick-and-dirty fix to the problem of what do with the colonial Governors after the separation of the revolting colonies from allegiance to the British Crown. A quick-and-dirty fix given a theoretical framework by Montesquieu's hilariously inaccurate theorising about how the British political system worked.

A civil war and an ever-nearer civil war later, executive Presidents and executive Governors is a quick-and-dirty fix that is way past its used-by date. Especially given that presidential republics generally have remarkably poor records.

So, I say to the citizens of the American Republic: bring back umpires! Put a lid on the political polarisation! Become a Parliamentary Republic.

(Alternatively, go the whole hog and become a monarchy again. That seriously separates the power and the glory and creates a thoroughly non-political umpire. Princess Anne, the Princess Royal, is sensible, and potentially available. A former Olympian even. I am sure she wouldn't mind one-upping her brother.

However amusing a thought, doing the full monarchy option is not necessary.)

Becoming a Parliamentary Republic would be surprisingly constitutionally easy, and would put umpires back into a political system that desperately needs some limit to the processes of polarisation that are pulling the American Republic apart.

Some considerations of evolutionary theory

Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.
Theodosius Grygorovych Dobzhansky (1900-1975)


Pair bond is not the same as sexual activity
One of the things I find somewhat frustrating is not consistently using terminology that distinguishes between pair bonding and who an organism has sex with. Clearly, there is some overlap and connection there, but they are not the same thing and it encourages sloppy thinking to use the same terminology to cover both.

Thus 'monogamy' can mean only has sex with one person or only has one spouse. This ambiguity can derail discussions and confuse analysis.


Genes play games
All that is required for game theory to operate is patterns of stimulus and response in a competitive environment. We can reasonably think of genes as playing a game, the replication game, where success is measured by replication. If you replicate, you are still in the game, so you are a winner and you remain a winner for as long as you are still being replicated.

These replication games that genes play are not only recurring, they are also probabilistic. A replication pattern will always have some failures. It is generating enough successes to stay in the game that is crucial.


Genes do not have intentions
The Selfish Gene is a very vivid and memorable metaphor. It is also an unfortunate one, as genes do not have intentions. Life is a Game Genes Play, or something similar, might have been a better title.


Parenting is altruistic behaviour
Biologists seem to have this odd notion that parenting is not altruistic behaviour, on the grounds that it is not altruistic to reproduce one’s genes. The notion that acting in a way that permits one’s genes to replicate does not show altruism is to imply that something cannot be altruistic if it conforms to the intentions that genes do not have. Or that genes are part of an organism, even when in another organism.

Parenting absolutely is altruistic behaviour. It is one organism investing in the interests of another. The tensions between the interests of the parent and the child provide a nice example of how of genetic replication is distinct from the interest of the organism. Tensions that are particularly stark in the case of neglectful, abusive or child-abandoning parents.

Parenting is the form of altruism that genes have to induce in order to replicate.

Once it is realised that parenting is altruistic, then it is much less of a leap to develop analyses of forms of altruism, in the sense of acting for the benefit of others, that do not as directly result in the replication of genes specific to the acting organism. Investing in the benefit of other organisms can absolutely be a successful gene replication pattern, at a probabilistic level. Especially if played out across a large enough number of individuals.

Confusing what altruism is—other-directed behaviour to the benefit of the other—with genetic replication patterns is an example of how natural and easy it is for us to confuse our frames of reference. Particularly if we use intentional metaphors (which are, of course, very natural to us) to apply to replication-game-playing genes that do not have intentions.


Survival strategies drive genetic selection
There is a critique of evolutionary theory that says that random mutation is not nearly enough to create the prolix orderings of life. This critique, associated particularly with mathematician and philosopher David Berlinski, is, of course, correct. Selection processes are, however, much more ordered than that.

The survival strategies of organisms create selection pressures. Organisms can only choose survival strategies compatible with their existing biological capacities. But, within those capacities, a range of survival strategies are likely to be possible.

Once enough of a species successfully selects a particular survival strategy, that sets up selection pressures, and selection pressures that are much more ordered than random mutation. (I am riffing off a 9 minute discussion of exploration by organisms by evolutionary biologist Bret Weinstein.)

A very nice example of this provided by human pastoralism. All human pastoralist populations that are large enough, and persist in their pastoralism long enough, develop lactase persistence: the ability to consume milk as adults. This allows them to generate about five times as many useful calories from a given amount of grassland as those who just raise animals for slaughter. This is a huge biological advantage.

Here’s the thing, however. Pastoralist peoples do not develop the same mutation. The lactase persistence mutation that allowed the Indo-Europeans to spread so far is not the same lactase persistence mutation as that of East African pastoralists such as the Masai.

So, which mutation develops, and how long it takes to turn up, that clearly has a random element. But the choice of survival strategy sets up selection pressures that are not random. Hence there is more order in observed biology than can be explained by random mutation, as the survival strategies of organisms inject order into selection processes.


Homo selection was for adaptability
The answer to the question of what is the human diet? is: prepared, particularly cooked, food. All human populations cook their food. Even the Inuit, who have to go to considerable extra effort to do so. We are cucinovores, food preparers, especially by cooking.

When we examine the diet of human populations, especially the pre-industrial diet, the striking thing about human diets—apart from food being actively prepared and frequently cooked—is the huge variety of human diets. Human beings can live and reproduce quite successfully on remarkably broad range of diets. (Problems with particular diet patterns usually don’t seriously kick in until after our reproductive peak.) This speaks to our adaptability as a species. An adaptability that has seen us permanently inhabit every single continent except Antarctica.

By adaptability I mean the capacity to choose and operate a variety of survival strategies (and therefore survive in a wide variety of ecological conditions). Prior to the development of farming and pastoralism, human beings were foragers, but there was considerable variety in those foraging strategies. And, of course, foraging then often led onto farming and pastoralism. Modes of living which also had considerable variety within them.

This adaptability has some manifestation across the hominin line, but is what is particularly distinctive in the genus Homo.

The combination of bipedalism and grasping hands led to tool using. This probably started with Australopithecus picking up stones to split bones and skulls from the kills of other species to get at the fat and brain. Access to such nutrient-dense food allowed us to give up gut tissue for brain tissue (the expensive tissue hypothesis).

We then moved on to making tools, increasing our adaptability. Choosing to scavenge in the middle of the day, when the major predators were resting, led to developing sweating and increased long-distance running capacity. We could then start running down animals with our expanded tool use, choosing hunting over scavenging. Giving us even more access to nutrient-dense food.

Being bipedal freed our hands for communicating by gestures. Increased use of tools moved communication to the face and mouth.

Use of fire and other food preparation both expanded the range of possible foods and further accelerated giving up gut tissue for brain tissue. At each stage, the expansion in capacities led to a greater range of possible survival strategies.

The predominant thing being selected for was that adaptability. Hence the rather prolix speciation of the Homo line. Different populations would choose different survival strategies, leading to different selection pressures. Yet, the general pattern is clear: selection for adaptability won out. Homo sapiens were the most adaptable form to appear, and relatively rapidly became the last biped primate left standing in Africa.

Our margin of superior adaptability over Homo neanderthalensis seems to have been relatively thin, as Neanderthals successfully blocked our exit from Africa for many generations. But Homo sapiens had enough of an adaptability advantage to get past the Neanderthal block in two waves, around 80,000 years ago and again around 50,000 years ago. And we Homo sapiens then became the last bipedal primate left standing anywhere by absorbing and replacing all other Homo populations.

So we became the tool-making ape, the running-and-throwing ape, the gesturing-then-talking ape, the fire-using ape, the food-preparing and cooking ape, the trading ape, the artistic ape, the ritual ape ... All manifestations of being the adaptable ape. It was that adaptability which was being selected for. As the more adaptable, the greater the range and variability of ecology and climate we could successfully reproduce in and the greater range of ecological changes (some of us) could survive.


Defence mechanisms and healthy eating
The prime defence mechanisms of animals is mobility. The prime defence mechanisms of plants, given they generally cannot move, is to wage chemical and other biological warfare against their predators. A process that can include considerable production of anti-nutrients.

Human evolution relied at various crucial stages on access to animal food, particularly saturated fats and organ meats, because they are so nutrient-dense. (There is no plant food remotely as nutrient-dense as liver.) For human nutrition, there are essential proteins, there are essential fats. There are no essential carbohydrates. With enough protein and fat, your body can produce all the glucose it needs.

We process animal foods for palatability. We process plant foods for palatability and to render them sufficiently non-toxic to consume.

So, thinking in evolutionary terms, how likely is it that saturated fats are not nutritionally sound for humans? How likely is it that plant-based foods are inherently or systematically nutritionally superior for humans than animal foods?

Markets and persuasion are also selection environments. How likely is it that selection for food-persuasion agendas is going to be for maximising extractable income? Which generates more corporate income, animal products or plant products?
So, does that raise questions about the anti-meat, pro-plant-based agendas being so assiduously pushed?


Norms economise on the effort required to sustain cooperation
When looking at human sociality, the selfish-versus-altruistic division is not very useful. Our range of interactions with others is much more varied than that.

What is striking is how much we are a normative species. Our nearest genetic relatives, the other African great apes, show some (very limited) level of normative behaviour. Enough to sustain the level of sociality they display. We Homo sapiens show far more.

Norms economise on the effort to sustain cooperation. Once a norm is established, interactions become much more predictable and therefore much more manageable. A whole lot of attention time and calculation effort is no longer required.

Attention and cognitive capacity are both scarce items. We have powerful tendencies to adopt mechanisms that allow us to economise on them. Hence the development of our normative capacity in situations where there were considerable pay-offs to cooperation. Cooperative payoffs that expanded as our normative capacities expanded.

Being so strongly the normative ape has permitted us to be much more complexly social. Which increased our adaptability. Which clearly increased the replication of our genes. A pattern of replication via cooperative sociality that we have spread to every continent, including temporary visits to Antarctica.

Norms can generate significant reciprocative behaviour. In fact, quite complex patterns of such. But they can also generate significant altruism, even amazing levels of self-sacrifice. All of which is a by-product of norms’ ability to increase and spread populations, and thus greater gene replication, through greater social cooperation by economising on the effort to sustain cooperation.


Resources affect reproductive strategies
Birds tend to pair bond, with both parents contributing to raising the chicks. This is because eggs are fragile, chicks cannot feed themselves and once the egg is hatched, neither male nor female birds have an advantage in feeding the chicks. Given a certain level of difficulty in obtaining resources, the male and female expression of genes have equivalent cards to play in the replication game, despite the females producing the eggs. They are therefore equally invested in raising the chicks, if their genes are to replicate. Hence the frequency of not only pair bonding among birds, but of the Dad strategy:  the male investing in the protection and feeding of the offspring. As distinct from the Cad strategy:  deposit one's sperm but provide no other assistance in the raising of offspring.

In certain circumstances- - for instance, if laying the egg means the female bird needs immediate nutritional replenishment- - then the replication pressure may be for the male bird to do more of the post-egg-laying care. To, in effect, equalise energy expenditure in order for successful replication to be sufficiently likely.

If, however, resources are particularly abundant, then male birds will likely revert to a harem strategy. (I.e. a mate-guarding Cad strategy.) With sufficiently abundant resources, what cards the female-expressed genes have to play in the replication game is much less of a concern for the replication of the male-expressed genes. All the male bird has to do is feed himself and keep other males away. If a completely promiscuous strategy is used (a pure Cad strategy), they might not even have to do the latter. The replication pay-off of more impregnated females being greater than any loss from the drop in investment in individual chicks. Hence it is sufficiently easy for the male-expressed genes to stay in the game such that a replication strategy other than pair bonding is used. The females are thus stuck with the eggs, and so raising the chicks, while more intense male mate selection provides some replication compensation for the lack of male investment in raising the chicks.

The general propensity of birds to pair bond is very unlike mammals, where females have mammary glands (so the food is right there when the baby mammal pops out) and hence are far more inherently invested than male mammals in raising their offspring. Female mammals provide baby-feeding resources from their own body and food consumption. Thus, in mammals, the male and female expression of genes do not have equivalent cards to play in the replication game.

Hence male mammals are very rarely significantly involved in raising their offspring. They may be pure Cads, they may be mate-guarding Cads, or even coalition Cads (a group of males sharing a group of females), but they are very rarely Dads.

Homo sapien males are a conspicuous exception. They are an extreme case of successful replication strongly favouring male investing in offspring. The Homo sapien big-brain strategy has resulted in particularly helpless babies whose brains and cognitive capacities have to develop outside the womb. Hence Homo sapien children take 15 years or more to be successfully raised to reproductive age.

In foraging societies, it is not practical to raise Homo sapien children without male contribution to provision of resources and protection. Hence Homo sapien males generating such a strong Dad strategy, contributing protection and resources to child-raising. (A few farming societies have an Uncle strategy instead - brothers contribute to raising their sister's children.)

With the dramatic expansion in mass prosperity, resource thresholds undermining the Dad strategy as described for birds has kicked in, but in a way that expresses human social complexity. At lower socio-economic levels of mass-prosperity human societies, the balance of resources compared to the cost of raising a (poorer) child has undermined the Dad strategy of investing in children. A Cad can still have children reach adulthood without bothering to contribute to their upbringing.

Conversely, women can abandon the Feeder strategy (seek to keep the guy around) in favour of a Breeder strategy (rely on their own income). Family law systems can also generate incentives, particularly if child custody is presumptively awarded to the mother, to move from a Feeder to a Breeder strategy. Especially as the state can be enlisted to extract income from fathers without that provision of income giving fathers any leverage for any role in their children's lives beyond cash-cow. They become a Shadow Dad - the financial costs without the participation, authority and status benefits of fatherhood.

All these factors encourage the rise in single motherhood, particularly among lower socio-economic levels of society.

These interactions also mostly explain the 'gender gap' in US (and other developed democracies) politics. Single mothers and divorced women have an incentive to vote for the side of politics more favourable to welfare expenditure and for family law to favour women. The latter can include, but is not limited to: establishing fatherhood (but not motherhood) as a matter of strict legal liability, giving mothers presumptive child custody, not requiring a DNA test to allocate paternal financial obligations, using the state to impose paternal financial obligations thereby (as noted above) profoundly undermining the leverage of fathers, not penalising use of false accusations as a legal tactic.

At higher socio-economic levels of human societies, the cost of raising a child is considerably greater and the value of social connections and networking considerably higher. So the Dad strategy is still going strong.

Human marriage is the ritualising of human pair bonding to support the Dad strategy. The above patterns mean that marriage is keeping on keeping on in the upper levels of Anglo and Northern European society, but decaying in the lower levels. To the advantage of the children of the upper levels of society and the disadvantage of the children of the lower.


Same-sex attraction transposes a thoroughly normal characteristicA characteristic that about half the members of a species have is a thoroughly normal characteristic of the species.

About half the human species is sexually attracted to males. A small proportion of those with this normal characteristic are themselves male.

About half the human species is sexually attracted to females. A small proportion of those with this normal characteristic are themselves female.

The same-sex attracted have a characteristic that is normal for the other sex, but not for their own.
The question is with regard to same-sex attraction is not, why does this male or female have this weird characteristic? It is, why does this male or female have a characteristic that is so common in the other sex but rare in their own?

The trait itself does not need explanation, only the transposition. Moreover, if neither the trait nor its transposition is itself significantly genetic, then the gets in the way of genetic replication, if transposed to the other sex, issue becomes moot, as there would not be specific genes, or specific gene expression, that were being selected against by that transposition. There would be no need for an explanation in terms of the chances of specific genes replicating.

Same-sex activity, even same-sex pairing, is much more common in nature than people generally realise. Which tends to weaken the expectation that same-sex attraction has a specific genetic cause rather than, say, an epigenetic or a population-dynamics cause.

Once we realise that it is the transposition that requires explanation, it then becomes more likely to be a population-level question, rather than just something that is weird in an organism because it gets in the way of replicating their genes, so should not be persistent.
Especially as it is an empirical question how much same-sex attraction does actually get in the way of gene replication. Thus, in those human societies where marriage is essentially a universal expectation, any reduction in the propensity to replicate any specific genes due to same-sex attraction may well be quite muted.

Suppose the expression of the trait in the other sex is significantly genetic and same-sex attraction is a serious block to gene replication, which it is likely to be in societies where same-sex pairing is accepted. Why would same-sex attraction persist in a population?

One proposal is the ‘gay uncle’ hypothesis—same-sex attraction increases the reproductive success of the siblings of the same-sex attracted person. In societies with very strong kin-group patterns, this has some plausibility as a ‘survive in the gene pool’ mechanism. But while most human societies do have strong kin groups, this is not a human universal across human societies.

Attitudes to same-sex attraction are strikingly varied across human societies. It seems unlikely that mechanisms that occurs in some societies but not in others, or that have varying degrees of social intensity, would have much explanatory value in explaining a recurring pattern across human societies. Especially given that same-sex activity and pairing turns up in many other species. Which brings us back to population-level analysis.

We are a significantly cognitively dimorphic species. That is, an overwhelming majority of men have a bundle of cognitive traits no woman has and an overwhelming majority of women have a bundle of cognitive traits no man has.

It seems likely that the same-sex attracted would disproportionately turn up in the cognitive-traits-bundles overlap group. This would imply that gay men would often display cognitive patterns that we more commonly associate with women and that gay women would often display cognitive patterns that we more commonly associate with men. (This in addition to having the attraction focus that we associate with the opposite sex.) Which is, of course, exactly what we do observe.

What makes us expect that the mechanism to associate cognitive traits with physical sex would operate to perfectly differentiate by physical sex? Why would it not sometimes cross-over? Same-sex attraction then becomes simply a transposition resulting from non-perfect association of cognitive phenotype with sexual phenotype.

Note that there is an interesting benefit to this pattern of overlap and transposition for us as a profoundly cultural species. Having a small, cognitively cross-matched group could assist in communication between the (cognitively dimorphic) sexes. Moreover, in a cultural species, having a small but persistent group more inclined to invest in cultural activity rather than children would also be collectively beneficial. In fact, these two features would run together.

It seems likely that the first occupation to split off, at least in part, from subsistence activities was shaman. Shaman often come from the cognitively cross-matched, displaying same-sex attraction and other cross-gender behaviour. It seems unlikely that any specific pattern of genetic replication would be generated by this role. At the very least, however, having such a persistent cognitively-cross-matched minority would assist in sustaining the advantages that we get from being a cultural species.

A cognitively complex, yet significantly cognitive dimorphic, species would generate more dimensions across which cognitive traits common in one sex might get transposed to another. It is a sign of our adaptability as a species that this too could be turned into an advantage via sustaining cultural and social connections.



These musings are part of the intellectual scaffolding for a book to be published by Connor Court looking at the social dynamics of marriage. As they are somewhat a work in progress, these musings may be subject to ongoing fiddling.

Why Gifts Are Not Exchange (and how exchange leads to money): a reconsideration of Marcel Mauss’s essay The Gift

I recently re-read Marcel Mauss’s classic 1925 essay, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, in which Mauss (a noted sociologist, influential in anthropology, who was the nephew of Emile Durkheim) argues that gifts, operating in chains of exchange based on obligations to give, receive and reciprocate, dominated public resource management in archaic societies.

I had forgotten how frustrating I had found Mauss’s essay to be. To be sure, having recently done a lot of reading into the origins of Homo sapiens and the operation of foraging societies, I can draw on a much broader information base than he could.

As an aside, if you haven’t discovered the online lectures from CARTA (the Center for Academic Research and Training into Anthropogeny), then I highly recommend them. A series of individual, or bundled, short lectures by scholars to audiences significantly of other scholars on the latest research into the evolution of Homo sapiens is an intellectual feast. An online gift to the global community of the curious.

Back to The Gift. Mauss manages to be a bit too general at times and not general enough at other times. So, there is an insufficiency of precision in his discussions — what he means in a concrete sense is often not as clear as it should be. But he also wants to make grand claims about stages of social development that do not really fit with the evidence.

For example, he writes:
The victory of rationalism and mercantilism was needed before the notions of profit and the individual, raised to the level of principles, were introduced. P.76. (Norton paperback edition)
Well, thousands of cuneiform tablets from Mesopotamia say that’s not the case.

Taking a step back, the evidence for long-term exchange among Homo sapiens is about as old as the evidence for the first Homo sapiens. We are the trading ape. So, the evidence is that Adam Smith was mostly correct when he wrote in The Wealth of Nations (Book 1, Chapter 2) that:
This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.
Smith is clearly correct on the importance of the division of labour, though not on its origins, which predate exchange. The ways in which we Homo sapiens are a dimorphic species makes sense on the basis of a division of labour between males and females that we see in all foraging societies. (Men do the riskier foraging; the hunting, and such gathering, as is not compatible with minding the kids. Women do the safer foraging; the gathering, and such hunting, as is compatible with minding the kids.) Smith is also correct in identifying among humans a “propensity to truck, barter and exchange”.

Mauss is, however, a little too impressed with gifts as acts of exchange. I want to suggest a somewhat different take.

Pooling, connection and …
The most intimate way that Homo sapiens deal with resources is pooling, whether within the family or within the hunting band. We are a group-living species who, most likely, evolved from group-living species. All our nearest relatives are group-living species (gorillas, bonobos, chimpanzees). It is extremely unlikely that our ancestors in the Homo line, and the various common ancestors with the African great apes before that, were not also group-living species.

It is striking, however, that the four surviving African great ape species have quite different mating patterns. Gorillas are a harem species where an adult male, about twice the size of adult females, dominates a group of females. Bonobos are a group-mating species based on coalitions built around an alpha female and alpha male (often the alpha female’s son). Chimpanzees are a group-mating species based on strictly male-only, female-dominating coalitions led by an alpha male.

We are a mildly polygynous pair-bonding species whose foraging cultures tend to strongly resist attempts to establish any form of dominance by any group member. Dominance only (re)emerges among humans either when food production permits storage of food or there are variation in productive assets. Dominance behaviour can get quite extreme, however, when there is both storage of food and variation in productive assets.

Homo sapien foragers engage in sharing, in pooling, behaviour for food (particularly from hunting) far more than do our African great ape relatives.

Use of fire can also be a pooling behaviour. Indeed, the answer to ‘what is the Homo sapien diet?’ is, cooked food. We are the cooking ape.

As the evidence for systematic use of fire in our evolutionary line is older than evidence for Homo sapiens, we pooled resources and managed connections before we engaged in exchange. Indeed, it is likely that it the development of those capacities that led us to becoming the trading ape.

But Homo sapiens had connections beyond the hunting band. (This is true in most foraging societies and the few it was not true of, you really didn’t want to live in.) Human foragers also might interact with people from groups that they had no connections with. With the former, the connections need to be managed. With the latter, any non-violent interaction has to be able to operate without being sustained by connections across the groups.

By connection I simply mean: repeated, mutually acknowledged, interactions that both parties presumptively mean to continue.

Across a wide variety of human societies, managing connections has commonly entailed both gifts and shared rituals. Participating in common rituals signals wider group membership, and intensifies the emotional content of the membership. Coming together for the rituals enables people to exchange information (including, even mostly, gossip), re-invigorate existing connections and possibly make new ones. What, in the modern world, we call networking.

About exchange
Exchange emerges out of creating mutual benefit from nonviolent interaction with those we lack connections with. This may also be ritualised so as to align expectations about what frame of action applies. Rituals in general get around the talk is cheap, so a very weak signal due to lack of required commitment: the cheap talk problem. But rituals can also operate when there is a lack of a common language — the no talk problem.

Gifts can be part of an exchange ritual. Or a bid to establish connection. Or both.

If you are interacting with someone with whom you do not have a connection, and are unlikely to establish a connection, there can be no expectation of ongoing reciprocation, for there is no interaction across time of a form that can be expected to involve such reciprocation.

So, the reciprocation of giving in order to receive, receiving in order to give, has to be done on the spot as a self-contained thing, hence exchange. Each participant in the bargaining process that leads to exchange swaps something they want less for something they want more. Thus occurs gains from trade. Both bargainers benefit, both are likely to want to be able to do it again, so the expectations of exchange are adhered to.

Thus, exchange is typically something done with ‘strangers’. Those you do not have a specific connection to, so do not have expectations of reciprocation that follow from, and are part of, such connection. But that simply makes exchange a specific form and tool of interaction. One, moreover, that can be scaled up, in a way that connections generally cannot (given the time and effort that connection requires), as societies get larger and more complex.

Exchange scales up as it an information-economising form of interaction. The across-time reciprocations of connection are a much more information-dense form of interaction. Hence, as societies get larger and more complex, the information-economising form of interaction of exchange becomes much more common and tends to involve larger and more complex goods (and services). That is, exchange will scale-up both in social ambit (how often, and with how many, people you do it) and scale of resources (how much resources will be transferred across a given period of time and how large individual transfers can be).

It is also worth noting that exchange is profoundly normative. The key element, as with all systems of property rights, is not “mine!”, any chest-thumping ape can do that, the key element is “yours!”. Hence exchange is bargaining over an swap of rights. I transfer to you my ownership of/rights over this in exchange for you transferring to me your ownership of/rights over that. Homo sapiens is the only species that regularly engages in one-off acts of reciprocation with strangers of the same species due to us being a normative and communicative species. We trade because we are a pervasively normative species.

About money
Money evolves out of the information-economising nature of exchange, as money economises on information even more than exchange already does. A shared medium of exchange for transactions means you do not have to know the specific menu of goods or services the person you are interacting wants in order to exchange with them. Hence the development of transaction goods — goods you hold solely for the purpose of transacting, as people will accept them as they can also use them for transacting. Once prices are typically quoted in terms of a single transaction good, then you have full-service money.

Money, as an information-economising mechanism, greatly lowers transaction costs. It makes exchange easier, so scales exchange up even further.

As money is typically used across time periods, it is an asset. A transaction good that was “used up” in the process of transacting would not be much use. Hence the standard obligation that issuers of banknotes accept to replace damaged notes or coins so as to protect their value as transaction goods. (Not having any liability or obligation other than such replacement is the great advantage of fiat currency.) But money is an asset because, as a transaction good, it is used across time periods. Being an asset is not money’s essential feature, however, it is a consequence of its essential features. We can tell this as, during periods of hyperinflation, when money is, by orders of magnitude, the worst asset to hold, people still use money, because of money’s information-economising properties. They simply unload it as quickly as possible.

I don’t much like the unit of account, medium of exchange, store of value description of money as it mystifies money unnecessarily. Defining money as a good held for the purpose of transacting that prices are quoted in (either directly or through accepted rates of exchange), and so is used across time periods, fits into ordinary commercial patterns and economic discourse rather better. The unit-of-account and store-of-value characteristics flow from money’s use as a transaction good. But money is not just a medium of exchange, as it is also used to quote prices and obligations in.

People sometimes talk of odd cases where something is only used as a unit of account. That, however, only works if there are agreed rates of exchange with things that are exchanged. Something used purely as a unit of account is not really money because it is not a transaction good, more a transaction aid. Economising on information in exchange is the crucial, transaction good, element of money, with the addition of the unit-of-account function turning it into full-service money.

The information-economising transaction-good approach to money also fits better with use of commodities as so-called ‘primitive money’. Any convergence of empirical expectations around a particular transferable commodity for what people will accept in exchange can turn that commodity into a transaction good. Hence the vast array of commodities that have been used as transaction goods. I distilled the following list from A. Hingston Quiggin’s A Survey of Primitive Money. They have all been used as ‘primitive money’ (i.e. transaction goods):
Beads (whether made of stone, shell, glass or whatever), beeswax, buffaloes, camphor, cattle, cloth (from silk to wadmal, a coarse wool fabric), coca leaves, cocoa beans, coconuts, strings of coconut discs, dye cakes, feather coils, gold dust, weighted gold, grain (notably barley and rice), human heads, logwood (mahogany), tool metals (iron, copper, tin, bronze) in various shapes, plaited palm-fibre rings, pigs, porcelain jars, balls of rubber, salt (including stamped salt cakes), seeds, shells (especially cowries), silver in lumps or shaped, animal skins, slaves, carved stone (a tool material), tea (including in bricks), teeth, tobacco.
When it comes to economising on information in exchange, it seems to be a case of, whatever works.

Notes and coins: branded moneyNotes and coins are branded money. If the branding is what gives them their transaction utility, the range and readiness of people willing to accept them as transaction goods, then they are just tokens. (The operation of supply and demand in their use as transaction goods gives them their exchange value.) If coins are branded bullion, then that opens up the possibility of a gap between their nominal, branded, value and their commodity value.

Notes can be claims on bullion, as in a silver standard or a gold standard, but that is a complexity we need not deal with here.

If the branding authority has sufficient incentives to be concerned with the branded value of coins outside their jurisdiction, they are likely to keep the commodity content of the coins stable. Indeed, if the coins establish a reputation for reliability as a bullion brand due to the stability of their bullion content, then the readiness to accept can give them a premium above their bullion value because of their ease of acceptance. That is, the brand can increase the information-economising nature of the money, and so its transaction utility, and thus its exchange value.

The less the exchange value of the branding of the coin, the more the potential incentive there is to melt the bullion content down for other uses. But any branding is likely to provide some extra transaction utility, and so increase the value of the coin above its bullion value.

The less the branding authority has reason to be concerned with the branded value of coins outside their jurisdiction, the greater the temptation to attempt to profit from creating (more of) a wedge between nominal value and commodity value. Debasement reduces the bullion content without changing the nominal branding. To the extent that the branding authority can force acceptance at the nominal value, and that there is a lag in perceiving the change in commodity value and/or circulating supply, it can profit from debasement.

Private operators can do something similar, typically by ‘clipping’ the coin, shaving off some of the bullion. Hence the ridges or milled edges on modern coins, introduced into English coins by Sir Isaac Newton when he was Warden of the Mint.

The more effort is required to assess the bullion content, the higher the threshold at which people will go with the nominal value rather then going to the effort of assessing the bullion content. So, the lower the preceding value of the metal content of the coins, the more the direct incentive to debase but the less the likely profit per coin from doing so. Turning copper coins into tokens is relatively easy, while official debasing of silver coins is more likely than gold coins.

The classic response to debasement, or at least to variable branding reliability, is Gresham’s law. This is the tendency for bad money (less bullion content) to drive out good money (more bullion content) as people economise on bullion in response to debasement by the branding authority, or debasement by others. Both official debasement and private debasements are also cases of economising on bullion.

Debasement and Gresham’s law, as forms of economising on bullion, both rely on the condition that:
there are two (or more) types of money which are of equivalent value for some purposes and of different value for others.
For ordinary users of coins, facing variable bullion content in coins of the same nominal value, there was a trade-off between economising on bullion and economising on attention and cognitive effort.

Economising on information is a pervasive element in the use and dynamics of money. Attention and cognitive capacity are both scarce items, so economising on them has value.

The point about the cognitive effort and attention threshold for worrying about nominal value versus commodity value can also apply to token money across time. There is considerable economising-on-cognitive-effort value in being able to simply use the nominal value of money in monetary calculations without any adjusting calculations. If, however, the money is changing in exchange value over time, then there is an incentive to adjust the nominal value for setting and judging prices. At some point (depending on rate of change in exchange value and the scale of exchange and the ease of doing the calculations), it is worth doing those adjustment calculations. Below that point, it is not.

Ignoring changes that are not big enough to trip the cognitive attention-and-effort threshold is called by economists ‘money illusion’. As if attention and cognitive capacity are unconstrained, so there is no cost in their use.

The notion that a rational being does not economise on attention and use of cognitive capacity, as if these are not scarce items, is a pretty remarkable concept of rationality.

Gifts
Going back to the evolution of human societies, there is no reason to presume a gifts-first, exchange-later pattern of social development. As soon as people seek to have nonviolent but beneficial interactions with people they are not connected to, exchange can be expected to develop. Exchange evolves where connections do not reach.

Gifts will, however, be very important in connection-dense societies, for the more connection-dense a society, the less need for exchange. Moreover, gifts are rather more information-dense than ordinary exchange. Indeed, a key element of a gift is acknowledgement — I see you, this is why I am giving you this specific thing appropriate to you. The more well-targeted the gift, the stronger the effect.

Gifts both rely on, and reinforce, the personalised information flows of connection. They are very much an intended statement of connection. There is more than echo of this in that, in common law, the intent to give is a necessary element for a legally recognised transfer.

The differences between gift and exchange is why I am not entirely comfortable with Mauss treating gifts as a form of exchange. I prefer to see gifts as connection-management acts of personalised acknowledgement. Hence gifts are used to create flows of resources in information-dense social environments.

Exchange does not really seem to be what is going on in such transfers in such societies. So-called gift exchange seems to be better described as networks of reciprocation. Especially as, as is set out below, gifts operate in essentially a permanent state of imbalance, avoiding the very state of completion that is central to exchange. Moreover, it is much more fruitful to think of exchange as an information-economising mechanism while gifts are embedded in information flows. With money pushing the information-economising a step further, thereby extending the operation and density of exchange. If money itself is given as a gift, there is, unlike exchange, no specific, often immediate, matching reciprocation.

But what about Mauss’s analysis of the obligations to give, to receive and to reciprocate? What about how gifts tended to dominate resource transfers in archaic societies?

Taking the resource-transfer point first, for gifts to dominate resource transfers (outside the areas of life dominated by pooling of resources) just tells us that such societies are information dense and dominated by connection. In a sufficiently information-dense social environment, gifts will “work” for the reasons Mauss notes. Indeed, a problem with his analysis is that he is so impressed with the social scale of the gifting networks he identifies, he does not think quite hard enough about the boundaries of those gifting networks and how far out those boundaries can reach and why.

This failure is striking given that Mauss does draw attention to a boundary problem that persistently turns up in myths, legends and folk tales: the boundary of the failure to invite. Which is to say, the failure to properly manage connection. This is the classic case when the cursed gift occurs. Think of the uninvited evil godmother in the Sleeping Beauty story. If you fail to include someone you should have, if you fail to acknowledge somebody you should have acknowledged, bad things will happen.

Of course they will, because your society as a whole, and your position in particular, relies on effective management of connection.

As for the obligations to give, receive and reciprocate, connections were managed by gifting networks. You give to show the connection is important to you. You give to the correct people in the correct way to show that you know your place, and your obligations in from being in that place. You are obliged to receive so that other people can manage their connections with you correctly. You are obliged to reciprocate to show that you also value the connection, that you are actively committed to it.

A description of the Japanese art of giving, ochugen, expresses this nicely:
Gift-giving is more than just buying gifts for people on birthdays and special holidays, it is a way to show gratitude to those you are indebted to and to show appreciation for those you care about and/or respect. Gifts are brought to houses that are being visited whether its just for a short visit, or if its an overseas visit. Parents will bring snacks or treats over to houses where their children would be visiting for playdates, families would bring omiyage (gifts) over to family member’s houses that they have not seen in awhile, and over to people’s houses in which they would be residing. Gift-giving serves an important function in Japanese culture as not only a way to show appreciation, but as a way to strengthen and maintain relationships, and in some cases, show closeness or fondness for another.
The more structured connections, the more empirical and normative expectations are aligned, the more stable connections will be. Moreover, the more structured connections are, the more expectations are aligned, the less of an information burden connections are. If one can rely on accepted patterns of behaviour, there is a lot less search and other information burdens involved.

One reason we can manage so many connections is that we are good at reading cues. Hence people who are bad at reading cues are disadvantaged in social interactions. But those cues are a better, less information burdensome guide, the stronger the framework of expectations is. That is, if there are agreed schemas of belief that generate agreed scripts of action.

The advantage of using structures and discourses to align expectations (both expectations of what people will do, empirical expectations, and expectations of what people expect you should do, normative expectations) generates the discourses around gifts and giving that Mauss is so impressed by. An evolving normative framework, set out and reinforced in myths, legends and gossip, helps people align their expectations. Hence the development of obligations to give, receive and reciprocate. You have to play the connections game in such societies and the structure of obligations are the “currency” within which you play it.

Connections operate across time, this is a fundamental feature of them. So, as Mauss indicates, inherently involve the notion of credit (and its converse, debt).

Yes, resources go in both directions, as having both parties benefit from the connection is required for it to continue and to be stable enough to continue. But it is better to think of gifts as a flow of resources rather than an exchange of resources. A flow of resources that both manages connections and provides much of the reason to have connections. A flow that, moreover alternates between patterns of credit and debt, so is almost always in a state of imbalance, not balance.

Mauss notes that reciprocation, being a matter of credit, can involve a notion of interest, and at quite high rates of interest. That is, as time passes, the level of expected reciprocation comes to exceed what was originally received. Such putative rates of interest can be, Mauss tells us, in the order of 30–100 per cent per annum.

If giving is an act of connection management, it entails a notion of credit. Having received, you have also show that the connection matters to you and that you are a person worthy of your status, who understands what is expected and can meet those expectations. The longer it takes you to reciprocate, the more the giver’s credit, and your debt as receiver, mounts. The effective interest rate becomes a measure of the period of imbalance in obligation and of commitment to the connection. The rolling pattern of imbalance, of shifting credit and debit, both manifests the connection and is a an expression of commitment to the connection across time.

You cannot reciprocate immediately. That stops it being a gift and turns into an exchange, an act without the information burden of connection and that robs the giver of the ability to express their commitment to the connection. But you have to reciprocate eventually, otherwise you are denying the importance of the connection. So, you acknowledge the period of imbalance and continue the binding cycle of imbalance by giving back with interest, by giving back greater than you received, thereby keeping the cycle of imbalance, and commitment to the continuation of the connection, going. Thus does each party move back and forth from credit to debt and signal their commitment to the connection. I put you in debt so you can put me in debt in return. I achieve a credit, so you can achieve a credit in turn. If we reached a state of balance, then neither of us has an outstanding resource commitment to the connection, which is thus put at risk.

Again, this does not really look like exchange, it looks like connection management via fluctuating, and deliberately alternatively unbalanced, flow of resources. A lack of balance alternating between the parties via resource flow, where the rhythm of imbalance is the key.

In acts of exchange, by contrast, the interaction is self-contained; that is the point. We both walk away from the act of exchange feeling like winners because there is no continuing connection that requires an ongoing resource commitment from the exchange. That is the, information-economising, point.

In very hierarchical societies, giving, and giving-up, can be an act of prestige, even dominance. Hence the deliberate destruction of goods in the potlatch. This is, in some ways, a manifestation of a society too driven by connection, too interconnected, and not enough open to exchange. Everyone knows too much about others, is connected too thoroughly with others, is too concerned by status embedded in connections, for exchange to operate sufficiently as a path for gaining value from resources. (Or, possibly, the lack of accepted opportunities for exchange is forcing everything into connections.)

Connection can be so dominant, that giving, and giving-up, can be an act not merely of prestige, but of dominance. Not merely of status granted by others (prestige) but an act of dominance over others. The structuring rules of connections require reciprocation, but if I am so giving-dominant that I give in a way you cannot match, then your loss of status can be so great, I can have a credit with you (that implies a debt to me) so great, that you are forced into bondage. Again, exchange is not the most useful way to think of what is happening here. Overwhelming someone with the flow of resources, so as to bankrupt their capacity to be independent, seems a better way to think of such dominance plays.

Particularly as it is very much not a gains-from-trade situation. It is much more of a winning-the-game situation.

Created within the dynamics of connection, the notion of credit and debt can be adapted to people with whom one does not have a connection, or not a sufficient connection. Thus collateral for a loan is what you do if there is no connection between creditor and debtor, or the connection is not strong enough to carry the risk involved in the loan.

Some exchanges create connections. Contracts create connections because they operate across time as the specified exchange cannot happen all at once. Contracts thus have a managing-the-connection element, especially as no contract can be fully specified to cover all circumstances. The trick is to structure the contract enough, and well enough, that connection management within the contract can handle the rest due to expectations and incentives aligning enough to do so. Hence the law sometimes treats contracts as simply exchanges that can be “paid off” with appropriate value and sometimes as a promise that has to be fulfilled. With a major factor to be considered being whether it is reasonable to force a continuing connection between parties whose interaction has broken down.

Employment contracts create particularly complex connections. A major reason why wages are “sticky” is that cutting wages obviously risks poisoning an employer’s connections with their employees. It is usually going to be much more in an employer’s interest to end a series of employment connections (i.e. sack people) rather than poison continuing connections with ongoing employees, creating a much more fraught series of connection-management problems. Especially as sackings can warn remaining employees that things are serious.

In both these cases, connections are operating across time and within, in effect, the “gaps” in exchange. Time is, of course, a key element in connection: whatever else connections are, they are things that operate across time periods. Contracts are for exchanges that require connection as they operate across time periods. Loans also create connections across time, though they can otherwise be completely self-contained.

Later in his essay, Mauss tries to discern elements of gift exchange lingering on in legal systems. The effort comes across as a bit strained, in part because his discussion is somewhat under-specified. Moreover, his attempt to connect gift exchange to solidarity in contemporary societies through state action is just sad. Modern states do not, and cannot, remotely operate according to the patterns he discerns in archaic societies. States are not personal connection devices, no matter how some attempt to romanticise them in that way. (This is not to deny that connections can be very important in understanding the operation of the state apparatus, but that is connections between individuals within state, and with outside actors, not the state itself.)

If, however, we see gifts as flows of resources expressing and manifesting the management of connections, then the later echoes in legal systems are clearer. But those later echoes rest in connections, and their management, far more than they do in the shifting balances of credit and debit, via the resource flows of gifts, in information- and connection-dense societies that Mauss memorably grapples with but does not really get to the heart of.

Marriage
Marriage provides a fascinating nexus between the resource modes of pooling, connection and exchange. The classic human pooling is men and women bringing different skills and abilities to the task of raising children via marriage. Yet marriage can often be understood as an exchange. In patrilineal kin group systems, kin groups trade out the fertility of their daughters. In matrilineal kin group systems, kin groups trade out the protect-and-provide capacities of their sons.

The protect-and-provide for sex-and-fertility exchange (plus domestic preparation services such as cooking or weaving) has generally been at the base of marriage systems, though with considerable variability in the expected level of the wife’s contribution to subsistence. The expectation of wifely contribution to subsistence was generally high in foraging and hoe-farming societies. It was usually lower, possibly much lower, in plough-farming and pastoralist societies. This typically weakened women’s social leverage in such societies. Hence plough-farming and pastoralist societies have tended to be distinctly more patriarchal than foraging and hoe-farming societies.

The exchange aspect in marriages could be very explicit in bride price (paid to bride’s family), dowry (paid to the groom), dower (paid to the bride). Bride price and dower pay for/acknowledge the fertility of the bride, dowry pays for/acknowledges the status of the groom. They all register relative scarcity.

Bride price and dowers are typical features of polygynous societies. These perennially have a shortage of prospective brides compared to grooms. For a women getting married took her, but not her husband, out of the marriage market, as he could take another wife but she could not take another husband. If the marriage is viewed as a contract, then the sense of an exchange of services could extend to notions of payment by the husband for the wife’s sexual services.

Bride wealth signals that the groom has the assets and connections to sustain the role of husband and father. For the other thing marriage does is create connections. The only feature common to all marriages across all human societies that anthropologists have been able to find is that marriage creates in-laws, it creates a kin connection. Bride price, dower and dowry all provide a way of creating a balance so as to enable the connection to be worth investing in by both families or kin groups. The value of the (continuing) benefit of the bride’s fertility (or the husband’s status) is acknowledged by the other party so that the marriage, and the connections it creates, and the pooling it is supposed to entail, can take place from a place of balance. A good match does all that.

Even though they are about allowing a connection to be established, bride price, dowry and dowers are exchanges for something rather than gifts. They are exchanges (resources for fertility or status) to create sufficient balance for the connection to be established and sustained. If the social gap between the parties is too large, then either the connection-via-marriage will not happen or the gap will be a point of continuing strain.

Although dowries are illegal in India, the continuing status of higher caste, particularly Brahmin, husbands, and the expansion, due to spreading prosperity, of the range of families who aspire to a higher caste husband for their daughters has not only meant dowries have persisted, it has led to considerable and continuing rise in the cost of dowries. Rather grimly, this seems to have led to a particular pattern of wife-beating so that the husband can extort a dowry “top up” from the bride’s family to match the rise in the price of dowries since the marriage.

In summary
Gifts take place within, or to establish, connections through a flow of imbalance. This is very different from exchange, the point of which is completion, and thus exchange typically creates a balance of satisfaction.

Indeed, the Chinese state traditionally re-characterised trade as tribute precisely to avoid an implication of balance in status. Thus the Son of Heaven would receive tribute in horses and, in return, graciously provide gifts of silk and treasure. It was absolutely not, everyone was to understand, an exchange of silk for horses, nor treasure payments for peace on the border, buying off potential raiders. The Son of Heaven was therefore absolutely not a merchant nor the equal of any steppe khan or khagan. Hence, the Son of Heaven entered into tributary arrangements, not trade ones. The status claims that such tributary-trade exchanges were wrapped in did not, however, make them not exchange, nor the alleged gifts other than purchases and pay-offs.

Gifts are typically embedded in resource flows so as to create and sustain connections. They are marked by a flow of shifting resource imbalance in an information-dense environment to make connections work. They are not information-economising acts of completion that require no ongoing connection beyond the participants, so they are not acts of exchange.

So, no, gifts are not an archaic form of exchange, nor are they exchange within archaic societies.

This essay is part of the intellectual scaffolding for a book to be published by Connor Court looking at the social dynamics of marriage. (There might also be some suggestion that economists and anthropologists should talk more.) As this essay is something of a work in progress, it is subject to ongoing fiddling.

A short rebuttal of anarcho-capitalism

Anarcho-capitalists claim that the state is the most dangerous social predator.

That is true.

So, their solution is to abolish the state.

What happened to stateless societies in history (of which there have been many) that survived long enough?
Eventually, some state took them over.

What part of 'the most dangerous social predator' did they not understand?*

*The idea that some structures can be built up that can successfully resist states or would-be states that won't be social predators themselves is a little implausible. Any political philosophy can be rescued if one is allowed to invent the necessary unicorns.