Showing posts with label social dynamics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label social dynamics. Show all posts

Saturday, April 15, 2023

Yes, I have a Substack

Christine Roy, Unsplash.

My poor blog, how I have neglected you.

I have abandoned you for my Substack, which is Lorenzo from Oz. It is here.

I have written there on lots of things.

In July 2022, I wrote on matters Trans. (https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/people-were-a-weird-mob)

I also wrote on information dispersal and disorientation with regard to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/disorientation-and-information-dispersal)

Then I wrote on Elon Musk’s bid to buy Twitter.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/whats-a-bot-or-few-million-between)

In August 2022, I returned to the Russo-Ukrainian War, in particular talking about why Russian autocracies have been one-trick regimes and keep pushing a strategy that keeps failing.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/the-latest-iteration-of-continuing)

I also wrote on why ritual is such a pervasive feature of human societies, including the ritual elections of totalitarian regimes.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/why-ritual)

In September 2022, I wrote about the death of Queen Elizabeth II, and the power and value of monarchy.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/a-monarch-and-a-monarchy)

In November 2022, I presaged the Worshipping the Future series of essays by me that are being published on Helen Dale’s Substack.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/introducing-worshipping-the-future)

I also wrote about the economics (as distinct from the Economics) of migration.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/the-migration-scam)

In December 2022, I wrote about the Worshipping the Future series starting.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/the-worshipping-the-future-series)

I also wrote about Social Justice as a social strategy: specifically a status-through-norm-dominance strategy.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/social-justice-as-social-strategy)

In January 2023, I wrote about Marxism as prophecy and a model for political action.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/prophecy-and-political-action)

I also wrote about how relationship to means of production is a dreadful basis for defining class.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/priests-and-warriors)

I wrote about that remarkable polymath, Ibn Khaldun.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/who-was-ibn-khaldun)

I discussed humans as the niche-creating species.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/the-niche-creating-species)

I discussed why the future is not what it used to be.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/the-future-by-default)

In February 2023, I wrote about how it is a mistake to over-rate the role of Marxism in current trends in Post-Enlightenment Progressivism (aka “wokery”).
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/overdoing-marxism)

I also wrote about the problems of the US mainstream media, the collapse of the previous business model, and how it is creates a “go broke, go woke” tendency.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/go-broke-go-woke)

I wrote about the connections between Zen thought and the flow states discussed by modern psychology.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/zen-and-the-art-of-flow)

I wrote about self-deception and various socially corrosive factors.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/self-deception-and-social-corrosion)

In March 2023, I wrote about basic patterns of human societies.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/basic-patterns-of-human-societies)

I also critiqued the concept of race, advanced the fiscal-sink hypothesis (that governments tend to under-police localities that are net revenue drains) and pointed out adverse incentives in “racial” matters.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/race-and-other-annoyances)

I discussed the need and difficulty of integrating evidence across disciplines.
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/wrestling-with-ideas)

So far in April 2023, I have written a two-part essay, applying the evolutionary lens to economics. The first part is here:
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/humans-as-information-economisers)
The second part is here:
(https://lorenzofromoz.substack.com/p/humans-as-information-economisers-cae)

Why have I neglected you, my blog? Well, this is free labour, but I earn money from Substack.

I have not sworn off you, my blog. But you may become just a portico to my Substack.

Wednesday, January 20, 2021

Human social dynamics and our (biologically) expensive children

From our helpless infants to the need to learn and be socialised, the years of effort required to raise human children has shaped our biological and social evolution.


The most important single biological fact in understanding human social dynamics is that we have the biosphere’s most expensive children.

A Homo sapien child does not complete the process of biological maturity until their early 20s. To get them to the stage where they can become parents is at least a 15-year investment, though longer is better.

It is not merely the length of Homo sapien childhood and adolescence that makes our children such orders of magnitude higher level of investment than the children of any other species. It is that our infants are incredibly helpless; that our toddlers need to be fed by their parents; that to be effective at being a Homo sapien, our offspring need years of learning and training. For we are the cultural species, who rely on learning to replace the instincts we mostly don’t have.

Expensive offspring to support expensive brains

All the above is both enabled and driven by us being a big-brained species. The scale of brain needed to be an effective Homo sapien means our brains have to do a lot of growing outside our mother’s womb. As it is, the size of a baby’s brain (and thus head) significantly raises the risks of childbirth for Homo sapien mothers.

Our infants are so helpless because their head is so large compared to their bodies. They need to feed voraciously to grow a body able to move our outsize brain around effectively while also continuing to develop our energy-hog brains.

Our babies have evolved for attention-grabbing cuteness to maximise the chance we will invest in them. We have the strikingly unusual pattern of maternal infanticide, as human mothers have to judge whether they have the social support to raise this child.

We are the longest-lived ape, because female Homo sapiens live for decades after menopause, so that they can switch from investing in their own children to helping invest in the children of their children. (This is known as the grandmother effect.) It allowed us to have longer childhoods.

While we are, along with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) the most proactively aggressive ape, we are the least reactively aggressive ape. This created sufficiently peaceful and cooperative social spaces within which to raise our expensive children.

We generally rely on prestige (bottom-up status) far more than dominance (top-down status) because our forager ancestors spent hundreds of millennia suppressing dominance behaviour. This enabled sufficiently peaceful and cooperative social spaces to raise our expensive children.

It is likely that our female forager ancestors experienced far fewer periods than modern women do, due to spending much more of their lives either pregnant or lactating. That the onset of puberty was probably later (than the more recent tendency for earlier-onset puberty) increased the effect.

As menstruation was a mark of fertility, yet was likely relatively rare, it is not surprising that it tended to be highly ritualised. For women and girls, menstruation and its ritualisation took the role that manhood initiation did for men and boys.

We are the only species whose females have breasts that are enlarged when not lactating. This is likely a signal of having the spare resources required for successfully bearing and raising our (expensive) children. Human males having relatively small testes but relatively large (but plain) penises are likely also connected to pair bonding due to having high investment offspring.

We have a history of presumptive sex roles that predates our emergence as a species because human children require constant attendance, so that human females did low-risk gathering and hunting (e.g. of lizards) that could be done while minding children. Meanwhile human males did the high-risk hunting and gathering (e.g. for honey) that needed to be done away from the kids.

We are a group-living, pair-bonding species — a very unusual combination. We pair bond so that each child presumptively had a mother and father to personally invest in their raising. (In the few societies that did not have marriage, that became mother and uncle(s).)

We are group-living species to better able to handle the risks of expensive children via expanded cooperation. Though it is probably more the case that we remained a group-living species, despite developing pair-bonding, to raise our expensive children, given that all our near-relative species are group-living species, hence our common ancestor probably was too.

None of our near relatives pair bond in the way we do, however. Gorillas are a harem species while among chimpanzees and bonobos, groups of males share groups of females.

So much of these evolutionary outcomes were likely interactive processes, for what enables also permits. Patterns that may have, at least in part, evolved for other reasons persisted because of how expensive human children became.

All these features of being a cooperative cultural species that relied on learning enabled us to become the technological species. We were tool users before our genus evolved, and tool makers before our species evolved.

All these things enabled us to become the cultural species, which required expensive brains which meant expensive offspring. For not only does what enables also permit, what permits can also enable.

Evolutionary novelty

As a consequence of the evolution of our technology, we now live in the first societies in human history without presumptive sex roles. This is an amazing evolutionary novelty for our species.

We also have people claiming that people who have never had, and will never have, a uterus and ovaries are nevertheless women. This is, of course, completely nuts.

This is in no way to deny trans identity. Many human societies have had trans identities. Such identities have thousands of years of history to them. Trans is clearly a human thing. But none of those societies thought a (male-to-female) trans person was a woman, because trans folk did not menstruate and could not get pregnant. Such identities were and are, very much, trans identities. They were crossing identities.

In societies where all or most people lived subsistence lives, who could and could not get pregnant was a desperately important issue. It had to be, given how expensive Homo sapien children were and how profoundly that affected the social dynamics of every human society.

How identity as a woman has come to be notionally separated from having ovaries, a uterus and functioning mammaries is a matter for separate examination. For now, let us simply take note of how important our amazingly expensive offspring are for human social dynamics and how important that has been for our evolution as the cultural species.

(Cross-posted from Medium.)

Friday, November 20, 2020

Peers and parents, past and present

Typically, the child-rearing not done by parents is done by peers.

Source.

Fatherhood, being (unlike biological paternity) a socially-constructed relationship of social identity, provision, care and attention, varies much more across (and within) cultures than does motherhood, which is far more biologically-grounded (at least until the infant is weaned). A small number of societies traditionally did not recognise the relationship of fatherhood at all, the role of male protector being taken by uncles. Even beyond such outliers, evidence from the anthropological literature is that the father’s attention is a highly variable factor in child-rearing.

The investment in attention and feeding required to raise a human child is considerable. Far more than is required to raise the young of any other species. As pregnancy and lactation ties women to the raising of infants, this leads to recurring risk-management patterns across human societies whereby activities that are compatible with breast-feeding, and other aspects of child-minding, become presumptively female roles. Those activities that are not thus compatible become presumptively male roles. The first scholarly explication of this was in a classic short analysis by anthropologist Judith K. Brown. An analysis that subsequently acquired considerable statistical and other support.

In his The Lifeways of Hunter-Gatherers: The Foraging Spectrum, archaeologist Robert L. Kelly includes a very useful summary of the anthropological evidence on child-rearing and its interaction with the acquisition of culture. (All quotes are from Lifeways, mainly Pp108–110.)

The two dominant social sources for transmitting or acquiring culture are parents and peer groups. They generate rather different patterns. Parents, particularly, mothers, are predictable and consistent providers of resources — breast milk, food, affection, attention and protection. Over time, the parents provide less and less resources until eventually the child is cut off.

It has been reasonably argued that parent-raised children learn that “resources and desirable goods are limited and hard to obtain”. They can also be expected to tend to be assertive and independent, focusing on using knowledge of terrain and technology to gain resources rather than social favours. In nomadic societies, boys tend to “de-emphasize male-male competition and focus more on manipulation of the world through technology”. Parent-raised children can be reasonably expected to show greater within-group variation in beliefs and behaviours.

Peer-rearing produces different patterns. Potentially from a young age (as early as around two years old) the child finds themselves in a group, often with older siblings, who become the focus of the child’s social interaction. A group that has less status and power differences within it than are involved in parent-child interactions. Children learn that there are “many sources of food and desirables other than their parents”. Peer-raised children learn to network (who people are, what they have, how they are disposed towards them); that resources are acquired by manipulating social relations. They learn that “resources are not scarce and can be acquired through persuasion”.

The acquisition of culture within the peer group can also be expected to generate less variation in beliefs and behaviours. (It is a long-standing pattern that any organisations seeking to impose uniformity of outlook tend to be inherently suspicious, even hostile, to family autonomy and seek to undermine the authority and independence of families.)

Shifts in the activities of parents are likely to also shift societies from having children being parent-raised to being them peer-raised. In foraging communities, the shift to sedentism leads to longer foraging trips by males and more intense food acquisition and processing by females, as consumption shifts to more-effort foods. This leads to less parental attention to children, leading to more peer-raising. A mechanism that “may account for why sociocultural change seems to occur so quickly once hunter-gatherers become sedentary”.

Peer-raising typically has quite different effects on boys and girls. Girls are typically assigned as caretakers, contributing to “girls having attitudes favoring nurturance and prosocial behaviors … [and] more restricted spatial ranges”. Fathers being away for extended periods of time “is associated with boys who have poor attitudes towards females, who are aggressive and competitive towards other males, and who, when grown, give little attention to their offspring, encouraging a continuation of peer-rearing”. A pattern we can see in contemporary societies in deprived urban communities.

In sedentary societies, adolescent male peer groups have greater importance than in mobile societies, with more violent initiations and harsher punishments. “These competitive groups define a boy’s success in life more than in mobile societies where, presumably, fathers are more often present.” Street gangs are peer groups with added income or self-protection element

Early C20th Chicago street gang

Source:

Cross-cultural surveys have found that “when men spend a lot of time with their offspring and cooperate in child rearing, there is less cultural emphasis on competition”. If men spend more time away from children, “there is a general physical separation of male and female tasks, and competition among men is encouraged”. (This could be a bit chicken-and-egg, if presumptively male tasks are such that they have to be done elsewhere.) “Partially as a response to male behavior, peer-raised girls show expression of sexual interest and assumption of sexual activity early in life, while also showing negative attitudes towards males and a poor ability to establish long term relationships with one male”.

Shifts in adult labour patterns can be “expected to have dramatic effects on enculturation and hence on cultural change”. These patterns clearly have implications well beyond foraging societies. Much of the literature on fatherlessness, for example, reads as the difference between parent-raised and peer-raised children. A sole parent clearly has less potential to counter-balance peer effects than do two parents.

In complex societies, peer groups may vary considerably. Much of the motivation to get students into “good” schools (whether public or private) is to ensure that they have a better quality peer group. Peer group effects also complicate trying tease out the specific effects of a school or teaching on education outcomes.

One of the counterpoints raised to the literature on fatherlessness is the claim, famously made in psychology Judith Rich Harris’s book The Nurture Assumption, that if one control for income/socio-economic status, the negative effects of sole-parenthood disappear. This is a classic problem of co-dependent variables. Bering a sole-parent family tends to greatly affect (i.e. lower) household income and socio-economic status. Normal regression techniques are not analytically reliable in such circumstances. One has to use techniques such as comparing single-parent with two-parent families who are in the same income range. When that is done, the dis-advantaging tendencies of being raised by sole-parent families become quite clear: as one would expect. (For those interested in pursuing this further, the footnoted citations in this essay provide a useful place to start.)

The anthropological evidence also lends support to identifying fatherlessness as a negative factor in raising children. With much of the effects of fatherlessness being due to the effects of peer groups lacking competition from family life, particularly for boys. This obviously has implications for socially-deprived urban neighbourhoods and other localities suffering from absent fathers. Elijah Anderson’s classic study Code of the Streets (a useful summary essay is here) is very much congruent with this anthropological literature. J.D.Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy also touches on these issues, as does the excellent study Trump’s Democrats.

The developing pattern in many Western societies of marriage (and fatherhood) being strong in the upper reaches of society but decaying in the lower reaches is yet another socially-polarising factor in such societies.

Cross-posted from Medium.

Thursday, August 13, 2020

Capitalism, Socialism and other terms to be avoided

Capitalism is a term coined, or at least popularised, by the enemies of the system they labelled capitalism. It was understood from the start to have a pejorative connotation and the term’s use is still dominated by that pejorative connotation. Despite the efforts of supporters of capitalism-so-labelled to reclaim capitalism as a positive, or at least neutral, label; particularly based on historical experience.

One should always be wary of any term where the pejorative element built in. Even if you somehow do not let the pejorative element infect your own thought, it is going to be there in the mind of many, often most, readers.

Socialism is a term coined, or at least popularised, by the proponents of the system they labelled socialism. It was understood from the start to have a positive, indeed overwhelmingly positive, connotation and its use is still dominated in many quarters by that positive connotation. This despite the efforts of the opponents of “socialism” to give it thoroughly negative connotations, particularly based on historical experience.

Capitalism has at least has some vague consensus on what the term means. Socialism does not even have that, as recent American politics has demonstrated, thanks to the attempts of Sen. Bernie Sanders, self-proclaimed socialist, to win the Democratic Party nomination for President of the United States.

Capitalism has some vague consensus regarding what the term means because almost everyone agrees that there is currently, and has been, a lot of it. Apart from some labelling of command economies as state capitalism, there is a general consensus that we more or less know capitalism when we see it.

There is no such consensus around socialism, mainly because socialists typically want to dissociate the term from every command economy that has ever operated, or patent embarrassments such as Venezuela. Conversely, the enemies of socialism what to hang every command economy that has ever operated, and embarrassments such as Venezuela, on any use of socialism.

If socialism has never been “really” tried, then it can never have failed. Or if there is this new form or conception of socialism that has never been tried, then clearly it has nothing to do with any command economy that has ever operated, or any embarrassment such as Venezuela.

Of course, one might suspect that this attempt to constantly separate socialism from history might be a bit of a warning sign. Especially if folk want to play the game of comparing the ideal of socialism (carefully separated from history) with the practice of capitalism (often using carefully edited, selected or re-construed bits of history).

For me, there is a simple solution. Avoid, as much as possible, using either term. Then you can at least aspire to some analytical rigour.

Other possibilities

That does not remotely foreclose considering new social possibilities. It just means trying to do so with some analytical precision without dragging along the deadweight of fraught ideological conflicts.

Moreover, contemplating the social possibilities that do not seem to be much explored can be a very useful exercise. To consider the dogs that don’t bark in the night.

If not separating workers from the product of their labour, or simply having the workers in charge, is such a fine thing, one might think that would be entirely possible to set up worker-controlled companies. Then the non-alienated, self-controlled workers might be expected to produce so well that they can outcompete capital-owned firms in the market place.

Of course, if your notion of alienation covers any attempt to produce for exchange, then even in a worker-controlled firm workers will be alienated from their labour. Of course, not producing for exchange then reduces Homo sapiens to the economic level of every other species on the planet. One might consider the possibility that producing for exchange permits the scaling up of production and consumption far more extensively or efficiently than any other way of dealing with the issues of subsistence and surplus. So, perhaps giving up an advantage that may predate our emergence as a species is not a good move.

Let’s assume that something we have been doing for maybe 320,000 years or so (and certainly for 200,000 years), exchanging things we have produced, is not some alienating disaster, and go with worker control is good. Worker-controlled firms is still an entirely possible option. So, why don’t we see far more of such?

What is a firm? A firm is a mechanism for lowering transaction costs and dealing with risk. Do we want to dump risk on to labour or on to capital? Surely, on to capital. So, a labour-controlled firm is going to make the decisions, and is going to need capital, but will also want to dump the risk onto the holders of capital.

So, which firms are going to operate better? Those where control ultimately rests with those who have to deal with the risks or those where control ultimately rests with those who get to systematically dump risk on to others?

Clearly the former. The owners of a capital-owned firm get the residual income from the firm because they also cover the residual losses from the firms.

Moreover, when we say “worker controlled”, which workers? The original workers presumably. But what if you want to hire new staff, do they get the same control rights? Suppose the firm has too many workers, it needs to lay off staff, how do you decide that? What are the dynamics of a group of workers who every so often may have to vote on who gets to be ejected from the firm?

Capital-owned firms solve these problems by essentially having a market in control. The more you are willing to buy in, the more control you have. If you want to leave, you sell your control rights. Decisions about hiring and firing are left with those who are managing the firm. (And firms with mechanisms for workers to become shareholders are still capital-owned firms.)

What about coordination issues as a worker-controlled firm gets bigger?

At this point, we can see why the somewhat Darwinian selection processes of markets select for capital-owned firms and not worker-controlled ones. It is not that worker-controlled firms are illegal, it is that they represent a risk-and-decision profile that no one (including workers) are likely to invest in. The closest we get are partnerships, and they represent human-capital firms, not worker-control.

And about the state

Consider again the question: which firms are going to operate better? Those where control ultimately rests with those who have to deal with the risks or those where control ultimately rests with those who get to dump the risk on to others? Here’s something to conjure with. Is not: a structure where control ultimately rests with those who get to dump the risk on to others, a pretty good description of the state?

People (often with good reason) complain about the socialisation of losses and the privatisation of profits. But that is precisely what an awful lot of state politics is about. Shifting benefits to one group and costs, including risks, to another because the coercive power of the state makes that a game that can be played (and is obviously one with significant potential pay-offs). When one sees risks being shifted from capital to labour, there is generally some state action underlying it.

This is why the term state capitalism has a little bit of purchase behind it. If you squint just right.

In a command economy, the state owns all (or almost all) the capital. So, in a command economy, risk regularly gets dumped by the capital-owning state on to labour. Including risks of mass starvation or environmental degradation. But that is not because capital owns the state, but because the state owns the capital.

Lenin, Stalin, Mao, etc. did not control the state due to their ownership of capital, they controlled the creation and use of capital due to their control of the state. To call such capitalist or capitalism is to get the causal drivers entirely the wrong way around.

So, yes, it is significant that state owns the capital in a command economy. It affects its patterns of behaviour and means there is no significant non-state control of surplus, so no significant basis of institutional resistance to the power of (those who control) the state. But the capital is entirely subordinate to the state. So, the society is not capitalist.

And we are back with avoiding the use of terms so weighed down with emotionally-laden connotations. Because, without those connotations, there would be no incentive to so badly mis-characterise the relevant social, political and economic dynamics.

Single-Spouse Marriage Systems: the elite male problem

While most human marriages have been one husband, one wife, most human societies have permitted multiple-spouse marriages. Most commonly, they permitted a man to have more than one wife.

Since fathering a child takes rather less inherent biological effort than mothering one, it is hardly surprising that multiple wives (polygyny) is the most common deviation from single-spouse marriage.

In societies where women make substantial contributions to subsistence — almost invariably, hoe-farming societies — rates of polygyny can get very high. For the cost of adding extra wives is much less than in societies where males dominate subsistence activity: typically plough-farming and pastoralist societies.

Foraging societies tend to have low levels of polygyny, as subsistence contributions are relatively even (the subsistence contribution of women is more constant, that of men more nutrient dense) and entirely labour driven. There are no productive assets, beyond weapons and other hand-held tools.

The landscape management and foraging complexity of Aboriginal societies in Australia generated distinctive patterns of gerontocratic polygyny. Old men married young women, young men married their widows and, in their old age, married young women. It kept fertility down and fostered the transfer of complex foraging knowledge across the generations. They also developed some extraordinarily complex marriage-and-kin systems as part of complex landscape management, as that preserved a rolling network of kin connections.

If women control the main productive asset, and there is no other basis for elite male status, then there is no elite male problem. If that is not the case, then if a society is going to have compulsory single-spouse marriage systems, it is the elite males who have to be convinced. There seems to be two general reasons for the elite males to accept single-spouse marriage.

First, there are very strong pressures for social cohesion. If there is a need to have maximum internal cohesiveness against outside groups — specifically, if there is a need to include low-status males — then a single-spouse system minimises internal sexual competition and maximises the breadth of stakes in the success of the group. The fewer elite males there are, the lower the cohesion pressures need to be for such an arrangement to emerge.

This is the pattern that seems to explain the emergence of single-spouse systems in the classical Mediterranean and in groups such as the early Christians and the Alevis. In the case of classical Greece and Rome, access to slaves further reduced the cost of single-spouse marriage to elite males.

The second reason for single-spouse marriage being accepted by elite males is if the education cost of raising a child, particularly a son, to elite status is sufficiently high. Multiple-wife systems mean less investment by the father in individual children. If such an investment is at a premium, then a single wife is a better option.

This is the pattern you see in the Indian caste system and in the modern world. Brahmins could theoretically have multiple wives, but very rarely did, as the training investment in raising a Brahmin son was so high. Indeed, this very high training cost seems likely to be the reason why the jati system developed — to ensure the daughters of Brahmin, who understood the needs of raising a Brahmin son, were available to marry Brahmin grooms.

Single-spouse systems did not develop as territorial or population expansion devices. On the contrary, polygyny is a much better territorial expansion device because it creates a shortage of wives. Polygyny creates a shortage of wives as a woman who gets married leaves the marriage market, but her husband does not. So low-status men end up excluded from the marriage market. The classic response to this problem is “those people over there have women, take theirs”.

Islam sanctified this pattern, with the Quran explicitly endorsing sexual access to “those your right hand possesses” (Ma malakat aymanukum: i.e. women acquired by the sword). Sanctified sexual predation helped drive the territorial expansion of Islam for a thousand years. From its rise in C7th Arabia to the turning back of Islamic expansion into Europe after the Battle of Vienna, 12 September 1683. (And yes, that is apparently why 11 September was chosen in 2001.)

The Norse (Viking) raids also seemed to have been significantly fuelled by polygyny and died away as the Norse lands Christianised.

If external expansion is fuelled by low-status men seeking women that the local marriage market does not provide them, then elite males have no reason to accept a single-spouse system. Which comes back to; if one wants to explain why a single-spouse system is being accepted, then one has to explain why elite males have accepted the system, as they are giving up the benefits of multiple wives.


These musings are part of the intellectual scaffolding for a book to be published by Connor Court looking at the social dynamics of marriage. As they are somewhat a work in progress, they may be subject to ongoing fiddling.

Tuesday, August 4, 2020

Why Gifts Are Not Exchange (and how exchange leads to money): a reconsideration of Marcel Mauss’s essay The Gift

I recently re-read Marcel Mauss’s classic 1925 essay, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies, in which Mauss (a noted sociologist, influential in anthropology, who was the nephew of Emile Durkheim) argues that gifts, operating in chains of exchange based on obligations to give, receive and reciprocate, dominated public resource management in archaic societies.

I had forgotten how frustrating I had found Mauss’s essay to be. To be sure, having recently done a lot of reading into the origins of Homo sapiens and the operation of foraging societies, I can draw on a much broader information base than he could.

As an aside, if you haven’t discovered the online lectures from CARTA (the Center for Academic Research and Training into Anthropogeny), then I highly recommend them. A series of individual, or bundled, short lectures by scholars to audiences significantly of other scholars on the latest research into the evolution of Homo sapiens is an intellectual feast. An online gift to the global community of the curious.

Back to The Gift. Mauss manages to be a bit too general at times and not general enough at other times. So, there is an insufficiency of precision in his discussions — what he means in a concrete sense is often not as clear as it should be. But he also wants to make grand claims about stages of social development that do not really fit with the evidence.

For example, he writes:
The victory of rationalism and mercantilism was needed before the notions of profit and the individual, raised to the level of principles, were introduced. P.76. (Norton paperback edition)
Well, thousands of cuneiform tablets from Mesopotamia say that’s not the case.

Taking a step back, the evidence for long-term exchange among Homo sapiens is about as old as the evidence for the first Homo sapiens. We are the trading ape. So, the evidence is that Adam Smith was mostly correct when he wrote in The Wealth of Nations (Book 1, Chapter 2) that:
This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.
Smith is clearly correct on the importance of the division of labour, though not on its origins, which predate exchange. The ways in which we Homo sapiens are a dimorphic species makes sense on the basis of a division of labour between males and females that we see in all foraging societies. (Men do the riskier foraging; the hunting, and such gathering, as is not compatible with minding the kids. Women do the safer foraging; the gathering, and such hunting, as is compatible with minding the kids.) Smith is also correct in identifying among humans a “propensity to truck, barter and exchange”.

Mauss is, however, a little too impressed with gifts as acts of exchange. I want to suggest a somewhat different take.

Pooling, connection and …
The most intimate way that Homo sapiens deal with resources is pooling, whether within the family or within the hunting band. We are a group-living species who, most likely, evolved from group-living species. All our nearest relatives are group-living species (gorillas, bonobos, chimpanzees). It is extremely unlikely that our ancestors in the Homo line, and the various common ancestors with the African great apes before that, were not also group-living species.

It is striking, however, that the four surviving African great ape species have quite different mating patterns. Gorillas are a harem species where an adult male, about twice the size of adult females, dominates a group of females. Bonobos are a group-mating species based on coalitions built around an alpha female and alpha male (often the alpha female’s son). Chimpanzees are a group-mating species based on strictly male-only, female-dominating coalitions led by an alpha male.

We are a mildly polygynous pair-bonding species whose foraging cultures tend to strongly resist attempts to establish any form of dominance by any group member. Dominance only (re)emerges among humans either when food production permits storage of food or there are variation in productive assets. Dominance behaviour can get quite extreme, however, when there is both storage of food and variation in productive assets.

Homo sapien foragers engage in sharing, in pooling, behaviour for food (particularly from hunting) far more than do our African great ape relatives.

Use of fire can also be a pooling behaviour. Indeed, the answer to ‘what is the Homo sapien diet?’ is, cooked food. We are the cooking ape.

As the evidence for systematic use of fire in our evolutionary line is older than evidence for Homo sapiens, we pooled resources and managed connections before we engaged in exchange. Indeed, it is likely that it the development of those capacities that led us to becoming the trading ape.

But Homo sapiens had connections beyond the hunting band. (This is true in most foraging societies and the few it was not true of, you really didn’t want to live in.) Human foragers also might interact with people from groups that they had no connections with. With the former, the connections need to be managed. With the latter, any non-violent interaction has to be able to operate without being sustained by connections across the groups.

By connection I simply mean: repeated, mutually acknowledged, interactions that both parties presumptively mean to continue.

Across a wide variety of human societies, managing connections has commonly entailed both gifts and shared rituals. Participating in common rituals signals wider group membership, and intensifies the emotional content of the membership. Coming together for the rituals enables people to exchange information (including, even mostly, gossip), re-invigorate existing connections and possibly make new ones. What, in the modern world, we call networking.

About exchange
Exchange emerges out of creating mutual benefit from nonviolent interaction with those we lack connections with. This may also be ritualised so as to align expectations about what frame of action applies. Rituals in general get around the talk is cheap, so a very weak signal due to lack of required commitment: the cheap talk problem. But rituals can also operate when there is a lack of a common language — the no talk problem.

Gifts can be part of an exchange ritual. Or a bid to establish connection. Or both.

If you are interacting with someone with whom you do not have a connection, and are unlikely to establish a connection, there can be no expectation of ongoing reciprocation, for there is no interaction across time of a form that can be expected to involve such reciprocation.

So, the reciprocation of giving in order to receive, receiving in order to give, has to be done on the spot as a self-contained thing, hence exchange. Each participant in the bargaining process that leads to exchange swaps something they want less for something they want more. Thus occurs gains from trade. Both bargainers benefit, both are likely to want to be able to do it again, so the expectations of exchange are adhered to.

Thus, exchange is typically something done with ‘strangers’. Those you do not have a specific connection to, so do not have expectations of reciprocation that follow from, and are part of, such connection. But that simply makes exchange a specific form and tool of interaction. One, moreover, that can be scaled up, in a way that connections generally cannot (given the time and effort that connection requires), as societies get larger and more complex.

Exchange scales up as it an information-economising form of interaction. The across-time reciprocations of connection are a much more information-dense form of interaction. Hence, as societies get larger and more complex, the information-economising form of interaction of exchange becomes much more common and tends to involve larger and more complex goods (and services). That is, exchange will scale-up both in social ambit (how often, and with how many, people you do it) and scale of resources (how much resources will be transferred across a given period of time and how large individual transfers can be).

It is also worth noting that exchange is profoundly normative. The key element, as with all systems of property rights, is not “mine!”, any chest-thumping ape can do that, the key element is “yours!”. Hence exchange is bargaining over an swap of rights. I transfer to you my ownership of/rights over this in exchange for you transferring to me your ownership of/rights over that. Homo sapiens is the only species that regularly engages in one-off acts of reciprocation with strangers of the same species due to us being a normative and communicative species. We trade because we are a pervasively normative species.

About money
Money evolves out of the information-economising nature of exchange, as money economises on information even more than exchange already does. A shared medium of exchange for transactions means you do not have to know the specific menu of goods or services the person you are interacting wants in order to exchange with them. Hence the development of transaction goods — goods you hold solely for the purpose of transacting, as people will accept them as they can also use them for transacting. Once prices are typically quoted in terms of a single transaction good, then you have full-service money.

Money, as an information-economising mechanism, greatly lowers transaction costs. It makes exchange easier, so scales exchange up even further.

As money is typically used across time periods, it is an asset. A transaction good that was “used up” in the process of transacting would not be much use. Hence the standard obligation that issuers of banknotes accept to replace damaged notes or coins so as to protect their value as transaction goods. (Not having any liability or obligation other than such replacement is the great advantage of fiat currency.) But money is an asset because, as a transaction good, it is used across time periods. Being an asset is not money’s essential feature, however, it is a consequence of its essential features. We can tell this as, during periods of hyperinflation, when money is, by orders of magnitude, the worst asset to hold, people still use money, because of money’s information-economising properties. They simply unload it as quickly as possible.

I don’t much like the unit of account, medium of exchange, store of value description of money as it mystifies money unnecessarily. Defining money as a good held for the purpose of transacting that prices are quoted in (either directly or through accepted rates of exchange), and so is used across time periods, fits into ordinary commercial patterns and economic discourse rather better. The unit-of-account and store-of-value characteristics flow from money’s use as a transaction good. But money is not just a medium of exchange, as it is also used to quote prices and obligations in.

People sometimes talk of odd cases where something is only used as a unit of account. That, however, only works if there are agreed rates of exchange with things that are exchanged. Something used purely as a unit of account is not really money because it is not a transaction good, more a transaction aid. Economising on information in exchange is the crucial, transaction good, element of money, with the addition of the unit-of-account function turning it into full-service money.

The information-economising transaction-good approach to money also fits better with use of commodities as so-called ‘primitive money’. Any convergence of empirical expectations around a particular transferable commodity for what people will accept in exchange can turn that commodity into a transaction good. Hence the vast array of commodities that have been used as transaction goods. I distilled the following list from A. Hingston Quiggin’s A Survey of Primitive Money. They have all been used as ‘primitive money’ (i.e. transaction goods):
Beads (whether made of stone, shell, glass or whatever), beeswax, buffaloes, camphor, cattle, cloth (from silk to wadmal, a coarse wool fabric), coca leaves, cocoa beans, coconuts, strings of coconut discs, dye cakes, feather coils, gold dust, weighted gold, grain (notably barley and rice), human heads, logwood (mahogany), tool metals (iron, copper, tin, bronze) in various shapes, plaited palm-fibre rings, pigs, porcelain jars, balls of rubber, salt (including stamped salt cakes), seeds, shells (especially cowries), silver in lumps or shaped, animal skins, slaves, carved stone (a tool material), tea (including in bricks), teeth, tobacco.
When it comes to economising on information in exchange, it seems to be a case of, whatever works.

Notes and coins: branded moneyNotes and coins are branded money. If the branding is what gives them their transaction utility, the range and readiness of people willing to accept them as transaction goods, then they are just tokens. (The operation of supply and demand in their use as transaction goods gives them their exchange value.) If coins are branded bullion, then that opens up the possibility of a gap between their nominal, branded, value and their commodity value.

Notes can be claims on bullion, as in a silver standard or a gold standard, but that is a complexity we need not deal with here.

If the branding authority has sufficient incentives to be concerned with the branded value of coins outside their jurisdiction, they are likely to keep the commodity content of the coins stable. Indeed, if the coins establish a reputation for reliability as a bullion brand due to the stability of their bullion content, then the readiness to accept can give them a premium above their bullion value because of their ease of acceptance. That is, the brand can increase the information-economising nature of the money, and so its transaction utility, and thus its exchange value.

The less the exchange value of the branding of the coin, the more the potential incentive there is to melt the bullion content down for other uses. But any branding is likely to provide some extra transaction utility, and so increase the value of the coin above its bullion value.

The less the branding authority has reason to be concerned with the branded value of coins outside their jurisdiction, the greater the temptation to attempt to profit from creating (more of) a wedge between nominal value and commodity value. Debasement reduces the bullion content without changing the nominal branding. To the extent that the branding authority can force acceptance at the nominal value, and that there is a lag in perceiving the change in commodity value and/or circulating supply, it can profit from debasement.

Private operators can do something similar, typically by ‘clipping’ the coin, shaving off some of the bullion. Hence the ridges or milled edges on modern coins, introduced into English coins by Sir Isaac Newton when he was Warden of the Mint.

The more effort is required to assess the bullion content, the higher the threshold at which people will go with the nominal value rather then going to the effort of assessing the bullion content. So, the lower the preceding value of the metal content of the coins, the more the direct incentive to debase but the less the likely profit per coin from doing so. Turning copper coins into tokens is relatively easy, while official debasing of silver coins is more likely than gold coins.

The classic response to debasement, or at least to variable branding reliability, is Gresham’s law. This is the tendency for bad money (less bullion content) to drive out good money (more bullion content) as people economise on bullion in response to debasement by the branding authority, or debasement by others. Both official debasement and private debasements are also cases of economising on bullion.

Debasement and Gresham’s law, as forms of economising on bullion, both rely on the condition that:
there are two (or more) types of money which are of equivalent value for some purposes and of different value for others.
For ordinary users of coins, facing variable bullion content in coins of the same nominal value, there was a trade-off between economising on bullion and economising on attention and cognitive effort.

Economising on information is a pervasive element in the use and dynamics of money. Attention and cognitive capacity are both scarce items, so economising on them has value.

The point about the cognitive effort and attention threshold for worrying about nominal value versus commodity value can also apply to token money across time. There is considerable economising-on-cognitive-effort value in being able to simply use the nominal value of money in monetary calculations without any adjusting calculations. If, however, the money is changing in exchange value over time, then there is an incentive to adjust the nominal value for setting and judging prices. At some point (depending on rate of change in exchange value and the scale of exchange and the ease of doing the calculations), it is worth doing those adjustment calculations. Below that point, it is not.

Ignoring changes that are not big enough to trip the cognitive attention-and-effort threshold is called by economists ‘money illusion’. As if attention and cognitive capacity are unconstrained, so there is no cost in their use.

The notion that a rational being does not economise on attention and use of cognitive capacity, as if these are not scarce items, is a pretty remarkable concept of rationality.

Gifts
Going back to the evolution of human societies, there is no reason to presume a gifts-first, exchange-later pattern of social development. As soon as people seek to have nonviolent but beneficial interactions with people they are not connected to, exchange can be expected to develop. Exchange evolves where connections do not reach.

Gifts will, however, be very important in connection-dense societies, for the more connection-dense a society, the less need for exchange. Moreover, gifts are rather more information-dense than ordinary exchange. Indeed, a key element of a gift is acknowledgement — I see you, this is why I am giving you this specific thing appropriate to you. The more well-targeted the gift, the stronger the effect.

Gifts both rely on, and reinforce, the personalised information flows of connection. They are very much an intended statement of connection. There is more than echo of this in that, in common law, the intent to give is a necessary element for a legally recognised transfer.

The differences between gift and exchange is why I am not entirely comfortable with Mauss treating gifts as a form of exchange. I prefer to see gifts as connection-management acts of personalised acknowledgement. Hence gifts are used to create flows of resources in information-dense social environments.

Exchange does not really seem to be what is going on in such transfers in such societies. So-called gift exchange seems to be better described as networks of reciprocation. Especially as, as is set out below, gifts operate in essentially a permanent state of imbalance, avoiding the very state of completion that is central to exchange. Moreover, it is much more fruitful to think of exchange as an information-economising mechanism while gifts are embedded in information flows. With money pushing the information-economising a step further, thereby extending the operation and density of exchange. If money itself is given as a gift, there is, unlike exchange, no specific, often immediate, matching reciprocation.

But what about Mauss’s analysis of the obligations to give, to receive and to reciprocate? What about how gifts tended to dominate resource transfers in archaic societies?

Taking the resource-transfer point first, for gifts to dominate resource transfers (outside the areas of life dominated by pooling of resources) just tells us that such societies are information dense and dominated by connection. In a sufficiently information-dense social environment, gifts will “work” for the reasons Mauss notes. Indeed, a problem with his analysis is that he is so impressed with the social scale of the gifting networks he identifies, he does not think quite hard enough about the boundaries of those gifting networks and how far out those boundaries can reach and why.

This failure is striking given that Mauss does draw attention to a boundary problem that persistently turns up in myths, legends and folk tales: the boundary of the failure to invite. Which is to say, the failure to properly manage connection. This is the classic case when the cursed gift occurs. Think of the uninvited evil godmother in the Sleeping Beauty story. If you fail to include someone you should have, if you fail to acknowledge somebody you should have acknowledged, bad things will happen.

Of course they will, because your society as a whole, and your position in particular, relies on effective management of connection.

As for the obligations to give, receive and reciprocate, connections were managed by gifting networks. You give to show the connection is important to you. You give to the correct people in the correct way to show that you know your place, and your obligations in from being in that place. You are obliged to receive so that other people can manage their connections with you correctly. You are obliged to reciprocate to show that you also value the connection, that you are actively committed to it.

A description of the Japanese art of giving, ochugen, expresses this nicely:
Gift-giving is more than just buying gifts for people on birthdays and special holidays, it is a way to show gratitude to those you are indebted to and to show appreciation for those you care about and/or respect. Gifts are brought to houses that are being visited whether its just for a short visit, or if its an overseas visit. Parents will bring snacks or treats over to houses where their children would be visiting for playdates, families would bring omiyage (gifts) over to family member’s houses that they have not seen in awhile, and over to people’s houses in which they would be residing. Gift-giving serves an important function in Japanese culture as not only a way to show appreciation, but as a way to strengthen and maintain relationships, and in some cases, show closeness or fondness for another.
The more structured connections, the more empirical and normative expectations are aligned, the more stable connections will be. Moreover, the more structured connections are, the more expectations are aligned, the less of an information burden connections are. If one can rely on accepted patterns of behaviour, there is a lot less search and other information burdens involved.

One reason we can manage so many connections is that we are good at reading cues. Hence people who are bad at reading cues are disadvantaged in social interactions. But those cues are a better, less information burdensome guide, the stronger the framework of expectations is. That is, if there are agreed schemas of belief that generate agreed scripts of action.

The advantage of using structures and discourses to align expectations (both expectations of what people will do, empirical expectations, and expectations of what people expect you should do, normative expectations) generates the discourses around gifts and giving that Mauss is so impressed by. An evolving normative framework, set out and reinforced in myths, legends and gossip, helps people align their expectations. Hence the development of obligations to give, receive and reciprocate. You have to play the connections game in such societies and the structure of obligations are the “currency” within which you play it.

Connections operate across time, this is a fundamental feature of them. So, as Mauss indicates, inherently involve the notion of credit (and its converse, debt).

Yes, resources go in both directions, as having both parties benefit from the connection is required for it to continue and to be stable enough to continue. But it is better to think of gifts as a flow of resources rather than an exchange of resources. A flow of resources that both manages connections and provides much of the reason to have connections. A flow that, moreover alternates between patterns of credit and debt, so is almost always in a state of imbalance, not balance.

Mauss notes that reciprocation, being a matter of credit, can involve a notion of interest, and at quite high rates of interest. That is, as time passes, the level of expected reciprocation comes to exceed what was originally received. Such putative rates of interest can be, Mauss tells us, in the order of 30–100 per cent per annum.

If giving is an act of connection management, it entails a notion of credit. Having received, you have also show that the connection matters to you and that you are a person worthy of your status, who understands what is expected and can meet those expectations. The longer it takes you to reciprocate, the more the giver’s credit, and your debt as receiver, mounts. The effective interest rate becomes a measure of the period of imbalance in obligation and of commitment to the connection. The rolling pattern of imbalance, of shifting credit and debit, both manifests the connection and is a an expression of commitment to the connection across time.

You cannot reciprocate immediately. That stops it being a gift and turns into an exchange, an act without the information burden of connection and that robs the giver of the ability to express their commitment to the connection. But you have to reciprocate eventually, otherwise you are denying the importance of the connection. So, you acknowledge the period of imbalance and continue the binding cycle of imbalance by giving back with interest, by giving back greater than you received, thereby keeping the cycle of imbalance, and commitment to the continuation of the connection, going. Thus does each party move back and forth from credit to debt and signal their commitment to the connection. I put you in debt so you can put me in debt in return. I achieve a credit, so you can achieve a credit in turn. If we reached a state of balance, then neither of us has an outstanding resource commitment to the connection, which is thus put at risk.

Again, this does not really look like exchange, it looks like connection management via fluctuating, and deliberately alternatively unbalanced, flow of resources. A lack of balance alternating between the parties via resource flow, where the rhythm of imbalance is the key.

In acts of exchange, by contrast, the interaction is self-contained; that is the point. We both walk away from the act of exchange feeling like winners because there is no continuing connection that requires an ongoing resource commitment from the exchange. That is the, information-economising, point.

In very hierarchical societies, giving, and giving-up, can be an act of prestige, even dominance. Hence the deliberate destruction of goods in the potlatch. This is, in some ways, a manifestation of a society too driven by connection, too interconnected, and not enough open to exchange. Everyone knows too much about others, is connected too thoroughly with others, is too concerned by status embedded in connections, for exchange to operate sufficiently as a path for gaining value from resources. (Or, possibly, the lack of accepted opportunities for exchange is forcing everything into connections.)

Connection can be so dominant, that giving, and giving-up, can be an act not merely of prestige, but of dominance. Not merely of status granted by others (prestige) but an act of dominance over others. The structuring rules of connections require reciprocation, but if I am so giving-dominant that I give in a way you cannot match, then your loss of status can be so great, I can have a credit with you (that implies a debt to me) so great, that you are forced into bondage. Again, exchange is not the most useful way to think of what is happening here. Overwhelming someone with the flow of resources, so as to bankrupt their capacity to be independent, seems a better way to think of such dominance plays.

Particularly as it is very much not a gains-from-trade situation. It is much more of a winning-the-game situation.

Created within the dynamics of connection, the notion of credit and debt can be adapted to people with whom one does not have a connection, or not a sufficient connection. Thus collateral for a loan is what you do if there is no connection between creditor and debtor, or the connection is not strong enough to carry the risk involved in the loan.

Some exchanges create connections. Contracts create connections because they operate across time as the specified exchange cannot happen all at once. Contracts thus have a managing-the-connection element, especially as no contract can be fully specified to cover all circumstances. The trick is to structure the contract enough, and well enough, that connection management within the contract can handle the rest due to expectations and incentives aligning enough to do so. Hence the law sometimes treats contracts as simply exchanges that can be “paid off” with appropriate value and sometimes as a promise that has to be fulfilled. With a major factor to be considered being whether it is reasonable to force a continuing connection between parties whose interaction has broken down.

Employment contracts create particularly complex connections. A major reason why wages are “sticky” is that cutting wages obviously risks poisoning an employer’s connections with their employees. It is usually going to be much more in an employer’s interest to end a series of employment connections (i.e. sack people) rather than poison continuing connections with ongoing employees, creating a much more fraught series of connection-management problems. Especially as sackings can warn remaining employees that things are serious.

In both these cases, connections are operating across time and within, in effect, the “gaps” in exchange. Time is, of course, a key element in connection: whatever else connections are, they are things that operate across time periods. Contracts are for exchanges that require connection as they operate across time periods. Loans also create connections across time, though they can otherwise be completely self-contained.

Later in his essay, Mauss tries to discern elements of gift exchange lingering on in legal systems. The effort comes across as a bit strained, in part because his discussion is somewhat under-specified. Moreover, his attempt to connect gift exchange to solidarity in contemporary societies through state action is just sad. Modern states do not, and cannot, remotely operate according to the patterns he discerns in archaic societies. States are not personal connection devices, no matter how some attempt to romanticise them in that way. (This is not to deny that connections can be very important in understanding the operation of the state apparatus, but that is connections between individuals within state, and with outside actors, not the state itself.)

If, however, we see gifts as flows of resources expressing and manifesting the management of connections, then the later echoes in legal systems are clearer. But those later echoes rest in connections, and their management, far more than they do in the shifting balances of credit and debit, via the resource flows of gifts, in information- and connection-dense societies that Mauss memorably grapples with but does not really get to the heart of.

Marriage
Marriage provides a fascinating nexus between the resource modes of pooling, connection and exchange. The classic human pooling is men and women bringing different skills and abilities to the task of raising children via marriage. Yet marriage can often be understood as an exchange. In patrilineal kin group systems, kin groups trade out the fertility of their daughters. In matrilineal kin group systems, kin groups trade out the protect-and-provide capacities of their sons.

The protect-and-provide for sex-and-fertility exchange (plus domestic preparation services such as cooking or weaving) has generally been at the base of marriage systems, though with considerable variability in the expected level of the wife’s contribution to subsistence. The expectation of wifely contribution to subsistence was generally high in foraging and hoe-farming societies. It was usually lower, possibly much lower, in plough-farming and pastoralist societies. This typically weakened women’s social leverage in such societies. Hence plough-farming and pastoralist societies have tended to be distinctly more patriarchal than foraging and hoe-farming societies.

The exchange aspect in marriages could be very explicit in bride price (paid to bride’s family), dowry (paid to the groom), dower (paid to the bride). Bride price and dower pay for/acknowledge the fertility of the bride, dowry pays for/acknowledges the status of the groom. They all register relative scarcity.

Bride price and dowers are typical features of polygynous societies. These perennially have a shortage of prospective brides compared to grooms. For a women getting married took her, but not her husband, out of the marriage market, as he could take another wife but she could not take another husband. If the marriage is viewed as a contract, then the sense of an exchange of services could extend to notions of payment by the husband for the wife’s sexual services.

Bride wealth signals that the groom has the assets and connections to sustain the role of husband and father. For the other thing marriage does is create connections. The only feature common to all marriages across all human societies that anthropologists have been able to find is that marriage creates in-laws, it creates a kin connection. Bride price, dower and dowry all provide a way of creating a balance so as to enable the connection to be worth investing in by both families or kin groups. The value of the (continuing) benefit of the bride’s fertility (or the husband’s status) is acknowledged by the other party so that the marriage, and the connections it creates, and the pooling it is supposed to entail, can take place from a place of balance. A good match does all that.

Even though they are about allowing a connection to be established, bride price, dowry and dowers are exchanges for something rather than gifts. They are exchanges (resources for fertility or status) to create sufficient balance for the connection to be established and sustained. If the social gap between the parties is too large, then either the connection-via-marriage will not happen or the gap will be a point of continuing strain.

Although dowries are illegal in India, the continuing status of higher caste, particularly Brahmin, husbands, and the expansion, due to spreading prosperity, of the range of families who aspire to a higher caste husband for their daughters has not only meant dowries have persisted, it has led to considerable and continuing rise in the cost of dowries. Rather grimly, this seems to have led to a particular pattern of wife-beating so that the husband can extort a dowry “top up” from the bride’s family to match the rise in the price of dowries since the marriage.

In summary
Gifts take place within, or to establish, connections through a flow of imbalance. This is very different from exchange, the point of which is completion, and thus exchange typically creates a balance of satisfaction.

Indeed, the Chinese state traditionally re-characterised trade as tribute precisely to avoid an implication of balance in status. Thus the Son of Heaven would receive tribute in horses and, in return, graciously provide gifts of silk and treasure. It was absolutely not, everyone was to understand, an exchange of silk for horses, nor treasure payments for peace on the border, buying off potential raiders. The Son of Heaven was therefore absolutely not a merchant nor the equal of any steppe khan or khagan. Hence, the Son of Heaven entered into tributary arrangements, not trade ones. The status claims that such tributary-trade exchanges were wrapped in did not, however, make them not exchange, nor the alleged gifts other than purchases and pay-offs.

Gifts are typically embedded in resource flows so as to create and sustain connections. They are marked by a flow of shifting resource imbalance in an information-dense environment to make connections work. They are not information-economising acts of completion that require no ongoing connection beyond the participants, so they are not acts of exchange.

So, no, gifts are not an archaic form of exchange, nor are they exchange within archaic societies.

This essay is part of the intellectual scaffolding for a book to be published by Connor Court looking at the social dynamics of marriage. (There might also be some suggestion that economists and anthropologists should talk more.) As this essay is something of a work in progress, it is subject to ongoing fiddling.