Friday, August 22, 2014

That measure, it does not mean what you think it means.

This is based on a comment I made here

When trying to tease out what sorts of policies work and what do not, people often make cross-country comparisons of, for example, expenditure on education (such as, as a % of GDP). Trouble is, expenditure on education is a remarkably useless measure.

An obvious indicator of that is that expenditure on education and education outcomes are poorly correlated. But, particularly in a situation where most expenditure on education is government expenditure, there is nothing surprising about this. Government expenditure is merely the cost of inputs, and the cost of inputs does not tell you the value of something. Businesses seek to have the cost of their inputs be considerably less than the price they sell a good or service for and to avoid the cost of inputs being larger than what they can sell it for. While price is not a perfect measure of value, it is a great deal better than merely the cost of inputs. This is a petite version of the economic/socialist calculation problem and it afflicts all government expenditure figures which are not market-priced, merely input-costed.

A point that extends across the range of government expenditure. Do people, think, for example, that expenditure per ISIS fighter and expenditure per Iraqi soldier tells us anything about their relative military effectiveness?

Regarding education, comparing (say) Latin American expenditure on education and East Asian expenditure on education is almost completely useless. Family effort and expectations about education matter greatly. 
Must get a good score to get a good job and make by family proud.

Latin American societies are based on various levels of "social mercantilism", where very uneven provision of public goods (such as property rights recognition) and bureaucratic approval systems are used to protect "insiders" against "outsiders". While East Asian societies are noted for certain sorts of government interventions, they are more of the "market augmenting" type than of the "market controlling" type. And their markets are generally very open to firm entry (at least for domestic firms). 

So building enough schools and legal environment so everyone can go to school is going to operate differently in a society with strong education attachment and expectations (East Asia) compared to a society where which family you belong to with what connections counts so much more (Latin America). To put it another way, expenditure on education in a low-Gini ratio society with markets open to firm entry are going to operate very differently than expenditures on education in a high-Gini ratio society riddled with bureaucratic barriers to entry.
You trying to tell us that it does not matter who our family is?

Hence, comparing Latin American and East Asian (input) expenditures on education is going to be almost completely useless, given the vastly different contexts.

Much the same point counts with the term "government intervention". Market-augmenting actions operate very differently than market-controlling actions, yet both count as “interventions”. The real measure is how much government actions raise or lower transaction costs, commercial risks or otherwise get in the way of/promote gains from trade, but you cannot tell that from merely calling government actions "government interventions". 

This is not to say that there is no point to trying to compare large numbers of cases statistically. On the contrary, it can be a great way to sift through possible explanations. The trick is to be aware of the weaknesses in data (generally avoid mere input measures), and how very much context matters.  


[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Sunday, August 10, 2014

Gee, can I be a Guardian pundit ...

A US former special ops officer argues that ISIS is just using tactics (via) that al-Qaeda had previously used, which work against Arab forces, but not Western ones:
AQI/ISIL quickly learned to never use these tactics on the Americans. They regretted it in 2005 when they carried out a complex multi-prong attack on Abu Ghuraib prison - it was a virtual slaughter of all the attackers. On the other hand local Arab forces respond poorly these tactics.
Which provides an opportunity:
A massive defeat on ISIL could decimate their professional spearhead of veterans and break the image of invincibility. Just one drone and a Special Forces forward control team with a B-1 bomber package with could do that with ease.
Provided, of course, one can specifically target such.
Foreign trucks and weapons, local homicidal hatred.

Jonathan Freedland, writing in Comment is Free on the Guardian website, identifies the success of ISIS as being primarily the result of the collapse of state power--in Syria and Iraq. In Syria because of the civil war, in Iraq because of the US overthrow of Saddam and the sectarian incompetence of the Maliki Government.

Which is also, of course, the US's fault. Yes, getting rid of authoritarian dictators can let loose unexpected difficulties. But Iraqi PM Maliki has consistently refused to follow US advice. Which, as the elected head of an independent and sovereign state, he was free to do. Maliki's incompetence is his fault. This making only Western/US agency count is a tiresome game. (Also, do we remember that Saddam's wars killed far, far more people than the current unpleasantness?)

Now, whether the US should have committed itself to maintaining the backwash of European imperialism: probably not. But redrawing the Middle Eastern map in that way would have caused all sorts of diplomatic difficulties. Which would no doubt have been denounced by Guardian pundits as an outrageous use of American power. 

Meanwhile, Freedland goes on to lament the lack of power on the world stage. So, the world system needs a manager--who promises not to do anything that a Guardian pundit might complain about. No responsibility and moral superiority too. Can I be a Guardian pundit?

Arab messes
The trouble is, whether the US directly overthrows a tyrant (Iraq), helps a populace overthrow its tyrant (Libya) or refuses to get [seriously] involved in an attempt to overthrow a tyrant (Syria), it all ends up in a similar mess. Which rather suggests that the problem is not US policy, but Arab states not grounded in Arab realities. 

So, what should the US do? Provide military support for the Kurds and Maliki (the UK's plan to attack ISIS's fundraising has the right sort of target) and prepare everyone for breaking up Iraq. And probably Syria as well. But that would take more sense of history than is likely either in Washington or the offices of The Guardian.

There is, after all, not much evidence that the Obama Administration has either the perception or the stomach for such an approach. So, flailing around trying to shore up the backwash of European imperialism it seems to be.


[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Thursday, August 7, 2014

On not seeing the Middle East

Two now well-established anti-Israel lines of rhetoric are that the Jewish State is "Nazi-like" (Zionism=Nazism) and the Jewish State is "an apartheid state". What these lines of rhetoric have in common is that they attack Israel invoking comparisons which resonate in the West and Western political rhetoric, invoking comparisons which have no specific connection to the Middle East at all.

There is, of course, actually a political movement with an attached paramilitary wing which openly endorses genocide in its founding political Covenant and in its continuing rhetoric. That would be Hamas and it currently runs Gaza. 

But the nature, methods and goals of Hamas seem to be just too hard for many Westerners to deal with. Consider this piece by former US President Jimmy Carter and former Irish President Mary Robinson. It is full of the rhetoric of conciliation and "please just be sensible" that Very Serious People use to show their Very Serious Concern. Rhetoric that is essentially completely interchangeable--swap the relevant nouns and it could be a call for peace, goodwill and conciliation about any endemic conflict anywhere around the globe.

But Hamas is not interested in peace at any price. It is interested in the establishment of Islamic rule and the obliteration of Israel: a Middle East not only free of any Jewish state, but free of Jews, that is Judenfrei. Just as ISIS is currently massacring religious minorities in pursuit of the same vision of Islamic harmony. 

It is simply not possible for Israel to make peace with Hamas. All it can manage is truces of various duration until the next mini-war. If one cannot grasp that reality, one is engaged in acts of delusion, not understanding.
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem saluting Bosnian Muslim SS volunteers

Folk in Israel grasp that reality, which is likely why Israeli opinion is hardening, widening the gap between Israeli opinion and Western opinion. Part of what is going on is that Israel is becoming a Middle Eastern state. The dynamics of conflict have been driving it towards insider-outsider ruthlessness that is so much a part of the dynamics of the region, leading to suggestions that the most recent Gaza conflict is simply an eruption of continuing enmity, with no greater underlying strategy

Yet what has enabled Israel to survive, and even to thrive, is precisely that it is not a Middle Eastern state: that it is a liberal-democratic nation-state on the Western model, with Western levels of social cohesion and organisational effectiveness. This is perhaps the danger that the Netanyahu Government's apparent strategy of Greater Israel does not grasp. That giving into the Middle Eastern dynamic may fatally erode Israel's advantages in being in, but far from merely of, the Middle East. Gazing into the Middle Eastern abyss does mean that the abyss gazes into you. Indeed, the entire quote from Nietzsche is apposite:
Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And if you gaze long enough into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.
But Israel not being merely of the Middle East also feeds into its rhetorical isolation. First, Israel is judged as a Western liberal-democracy, and not as a Middle Eastern state. Second, Israel is treated as a "settler state"; a colonising and imperial intrusion into the region, thus casting the Palestinians as oppressed indigenes.  Which is again a case of not seeing the Middle East, given that about half of Israeli Jews come from the Middle East and are as every bit "indigenous" to the region as the Arabs. Indeed, in a sense more so, since their Middle Eastern identity is a great deal older than the Arab-Muslim one. 

Hence the two-state solution. Recent events has thrown into very stark belief a fundamental problem with that. Arab states, they do not work so well (for reasons nicely summarised in this piece). Which raises serious issues about why would a putative Palestinian state be any more viable? (Ironically, the most hopeful answer is--because they have been observing Israel up close for 60 years.)

Which is not terribly hopeful, because it runs into the "taking on infidel models" problem that organisations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, ISIS, etc are brutally committed to opposing. One of the fundamental problems of Palestinian politics is that hating Israel is both fundamental to Palestinian identity and the only common ground in Palestinian politics. It is likely why Arafat walked away from the best offer Palestine was ever likely to get: Ehud Barak's compensated borders proposal. He did not want to be Palestine's Michael Collins or deal with disastrously divided "ordinary politics" toxically mixed in with frustrated hate. 

The One-State "solution" would be even worse. The IDF is what makes Israeli Jews so much safer than any other Middle Eastern minority and there is no way they will voluntarily give it up. [Even French Jews are increasingly seeing the IDF as their preferred defenders.]

The problem with seeing the Middle East as it is, is that so much is so depressing. Hamas is a genocidal political movement whose only competitive advantage is well-organised hate who really was using dead Palestinians as a strategic lever. It is the real vector for Nazi-style ideas in the Middle East in a pattern that reaches back to the original leader of Palestinian rejectionism. But ideas that resonate by building on tendencies with Islam itself, including the problems of Arab society dealing with the modern world--in large part due to the dynamics of Islam. 

Meriam Ibrahim was born as the daughter of a Sudanese Muslim father and an Ethiopian Christian mother. The father deserted and Meriam was raised as a Christian by her mother’s family. She subsequently married Daniel Wasi, a Christian holding U.S. citizenship, with whom she had one child and was pregnant with another when she was arrested. The charge was apostasy and fornication. Under Islamic law the father’s religion determines the child’s, so Meriam is a Muslim. Unless she recants her professed Christianity she is guilty of apostasy. Marriage between a Christian man and a Muslim woman is prohibited, so her union with Wasi is fornication. She refused to recant her Christian faith. She was sentenced to death by hanging for apostasy, and for fornication to be whipped with one hundred lashes. Both sentences were to be suspended for two years after the birth.

There is no conception of an open public space where people get to make their own decisions and choose their own affinities or operate according to them. Sharia was, from its beginning, an imperial legal system, and that is still its in-built dynamic. 

Seeing Hamas as the closest analogue in the Middle East to the Nazi movement gets in the way of a whole lot of comfortable Western assumptions and rhetoric. But it is hardly the only thing that does. 


[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Sunday, August 3, 2014

ISIS, ibn Khaldun and patterns in history

One of the benefits of reading Ira Lapidus's A History of Islamic Societies (which I review here and here) is understanding how much Islamic history shows recurring patterns. For example, how conflict between modernisers (we should learn from others), traditionalists (we should practice the religion as it is handed down to us) and reformists (we need to recover the purity of original Islam) is a recurring dynamic in Islam, going back to its first centuries. Note that modernising learning does not mean mere techniques or technology--both traditionalists and reformers are up for that, where it is useful to them--it means we should adjust our understanding of reality by taking in what outsiders have discovered.

Recurring Islamic patterns
The outcome of these struggles is also a recurring pattern--the modernisers lose, the reformers win but Islam reverts into inter-generational transfer that picks up cultural accretions on the way through. (I.e. traditionalism ends up with the numbers.) In our day, the Islamists and jihadis (overlapping categories) represent the reformers, liberals and secularists represent the modernisers while most Muslims remain traditionalists. As I have noted before, Islam does not "need" a Reformation--it has them over and over again. What Islam "needs" is an Enlightenment

The trouble is, the logic of belief embedded in mainstream Islam militates strongly against any such outcome as it largely lacks even the precursors thereto. When Westerners talk about what Islam needs, what they really mean is "in order to be good neighbours in the modern world". (To get away from Islam having "bloody borders".) But, of course, an alternative solution is to make the modern world conform to the dictates of Islam. Which is precisely the project of the Islamists and the jihadis. They emphatically oppose adjusting the doctrine and practice of Islam to fit in with the modern world (the modernising strategy), they want to remake the world to fit in with (their understanding of) the doctrine and practice of Islam. 

Let us leave aside whether they can achieve the power necessary to do that, is that an attainable goal at all? Is it possible to create a society that lives up to their concept of a properly Islamic society? (Remembering that Islam generates very complete rules of social order, far more so than Christianity or rabbinical Judaism.) The long term pattern of Islam--particulary the regular waves of purifying reformism--suggests not. Indeed, Daniel Pipes argued, in his Slave Soldiers and Islam (pdf) (the book of his doctoral thesis), that the distinctive Islamic use of slave soldier systems (such as the mamluks and the Janissariesflowed directly from Muslim polities being unable to live up to Islamic ideals, resulting in a withdrawal of most Muslims from political participation and a search by rulers for ways to recruit reliable military forces. 

Even more paradoxically, adhering to Islamic principles (other than that of submission to Muslim rule) turns out to be much more common in non-Islamic countries, at least according to an economic index (pdf), composed for that purpose (full publication is available here, behind a paywall). In the economic index, (and apparently also in the final version) Northern European Atlantic littoral states (or former British colonies) score in the top 10, while the highest ranked majority Muslim country is Malaysia (also former British colony). As measured by said index, not being ruled by Muslims can get to you "Islamic" ideals more thoroughly. (The "Great Satan"--aka the USA--ranks better than any majority-Muslim country: apparently, those Muslims who claim you can practise Islam much more safely and thoroughly in the US than in majority-Muslim countries have a point.) Muslim rule is not so clearly the path to the Islamic-principles adhering society the jihadis fondly imagine they are fighting for.

But, of course, rule by Muslims is precisely what the jihadis are fighting for, not ticking doctrinal outcome boxes. What the jihadis and Islamists are interested in us whether you tick doctrinal adherence boxes and reconfiguring the social, cultural and religious environment according to such adherence. In other words, forcing the modern world to adhere to their understanding of Islamic principles, which emphatically means rule by Muslims (as they define it and them). Whether it is the Taliban enforcing the burqa and blowing up Buddha statues, or sub-Saharan jihadis in Mali or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) destroying tombs or "heretical" mosques, and enforcing religious subordination, the pattern is very clear. (And extends back to the original Wahhabi take-over in Arabia.)

Ecological frontiers
Human history is full of patterns, both general and specific, because of commonalities of human nature (both cognitive and physical), of human experience, because of geographical constraints and enduring belief. Islam in particular generates very strong, recurring, logics of belief which result in persistent patterns.

As do the interactions of institutions and geography in the deserts-mountains-river valleys belt from Morocco to the Ganges River; the region across which Islam has been dominant for centuries. The belt Islam has also had problems expanding beyond, apart from its mercantile spread to the Malay world and Africa's Indian Ocean coast. (These being explicable in terms of the commercial advantages of Sharia and Islam's appeal as an oppositional identity against European colonisers. Part of the general pattern of trade networks spreading religions.)

The Taliban, ISIS and Mali jihadis are also manifestations of a pattern classically delineated by C14th historical sociologist ibn Khaldun (Abū Zayd ‘Abdu r-Raḥmān bin Muḥammad bin Khaldūn Al-Ḥaḍrami: 1132-1406). High asabiyyah (social cohesion) groups from marginal areas attacking and even overwhelming urban-based polities.

The region from Morocco to the Ganges River is riddled with ecological frontiers. That is, areas which favour very different forms of social organisation. (Such ecological frontiers tend to favour [pdf] creation of empires.) The river valleys were, using the terminology of James Scott in his Seeing Like a State and The Art of Not Being Governed, generally highly "legible" to state power. Conversely, the mountains, deserts and steppes were not.  These favoured pastoralists where lineage systems provided protection, as explained in Philip Salzman's Culture and Conflict in the Middle East (which I review here). Because Islam provides no bar to cousin marriages (so daughters were married back into the lineage, providing sons for the same lineage, not a different one), and failed to created high trust polities, use of lineages for support and protective services was favoured throughout the region, even in the farming river valleys.

Contours of trust
[Longstanding social patterns] gave Islam a very strong competitive advantage within the region, as it provided both a means and a motive to unite pastoralist warriors across lineages. Western social scientists talk of low-trust societies, but it is more apposite to think of them as variable trust societies. They may have a lower level of general trust, but they have pockets of much higher trust. This highly differentiated levels of trust provides means for higher trust networks to flourish--either commercially (e.g. overseas Chinese in South East Asia [pdf]) or militarily. Hence the powerful recurring pattern of Islam failing to create high trust polities encouraging waves of religious reformism uniting religiously motivated warriors whose high social cohesion (i.e. mutual trust due to intense signalling of common motivation) then overwhelm urban polity-troops lacking such cohesion.

As we have seen with the Taliban in Afghanistan, the jihadis in Mali and now ISIS in Iraq.
Mali jihadis destroying a tomb in Timbuktu.

As an aside, while one can point to varying specific features of, for example, Arab culture affecting levels of military success, said features can be usefully understood as manifesting wildly divergent levels of general social cohesion compared to Western societies, which explains why Western forces typically find it almost ridiculously easy to defeat regular Arab armies. (Highly motivated insurgencies are a different matter.)

The politics of worldly salvation
Tying social cohesion to a particular belief system has problems for long term stability, however, and the more so the more "worldly" the ambitions of the ideology. One of the features that Islam (particularly political Islam) and revolutionary socialism have in common is the worldly content of their ambitions: they sell the politics of worldly salvation via achievement of unparalleled social harmony and success. The trouble is that performance inevitably fails to live up to the motivating claim--which then undermines the motivation.

Which is why the Soviet regime, in the space of its 74 years of existent (1917-1991: officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 1922 to 1991), managed to travel through the complete cycle of ibn Khaldun's stages of rule from rise to collapse: a pattern that can be traced through its successive leaders. First, a group bound by common feeling (asabiyyah) seizes power (Lenin 1917-1924). Then the ruler separates himself from the original group to entrench his own power (Stalin 1924-1953). Then the regime slowly decays as group solidarity fades and corruption erodes social resilience and regime power (Khruschev, BrezhnevAndropov, Chernenko 1953-1985). Until the regime finally collapses (Gorbachev 1985-1991).

The Soviet regime can also be seen as following an accelerated version of the cycles of peak-and-decay that the three "mandarin" Chinese dynasties (Song 960-1279, Ming 1368-1644, Qing 1644-1912) went through. The three rule-by-meritocratic-bureaucracy dynasties lasted similar amounts of time (312, 276, 267 years respectively) and each went through a similar peak-and-decline cycle, which can reasonably be seen (pdf) as a specific principal-agent problem.

Another way to put it is that the mandarin dynasties relied solely on command-and-control, which greatly limited their feedback mechanisms and social levers; with even the levers they did have dissipating as collusive networks spread (applying Mancur Olson's analysis of the Soviet command-and-control system). The difference being that, unlike the command economies, the mandarin dynasties did not attempt to command-and-control everything, so the command economies were eaten away by corruption much faster, and in much sharper contradiction to their far more hubristic claims.

Nevertheless, I would put more emphasis on the social cohesion cycle, as the Soviet regime did follow ibn Khaldun's pattern of dynastic rise and decay much more specifically, while seeing the single-lifetime speed of the cycle as the consequences of the effects of hubristic-in-aim-and-scope command-and-control.

Russian patterns
Tsarist Russia was very much a variable trust society: even more so once the Russian Civil War (1917-1922) was underway. While societies wracked by civil war are obviously highly variable in trust during the conflict, after the conflict is over, they will, after a recovery period which will be affected by the duration and intensity of the conflict, tend to revert to their long term patterns (e.g. England after the English Civil War 1642-1651, Switzerland after the Swiss Civil War 1847, the US after the American Civil War (1861-5),  and Finland after the Finnish Civil War 1918).

Russia went into the "Leninist deep freeze" with the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War, but has emerged out the other end a genuinely low trust society (that is, even family connections have limited trust value) due to the "institution-and-connection flattening" nature of Leninist rule. (Which also leads to the ironic spectacle of the officially Leninist Beijing regime pushing Confucianism, in part to revitalise family feeling.) Russia has the pretensions to the formal political mechanisms of Western societies (elections, rule of law, etc), but lacks the social cohesion to back them up, which makes the sort of authoritarian rule Vladimir Putin has established a likely social outcome. Adventurism in foreign policy to achieve a form of "success" useful for such rule is a recurring feature of such regimes. Which does much to explain the patterns of postwar Middle Eastern history.

Searching for cohesion
As does the fact that Middle Eastern state boundaries--notably Lebanon, Syria and Iraq--represent the backwash of European imperialism. Neither Syria nor Iraq have any serious common social cohesion to back them up, the states in question (currently fairly irrelevant lines on maps) being not much more than mechanisms for a dominant group to repress other groups. (Lebanon does not have any serious common social cohesion either, but the state is too weak to do much in the way of repression.) It would probably be stabilising for state boundaries to better reflect patterns of social cohesion--which suggests that breaking up both Syria and Iraq would be more likely to produce social stability.

But only up to a point. Not all significant social identities in the Middle East have territorial bases. Hence 800,000 to 1m Jews fleeing to Israel and the West from 1948 to the 1970s and the exodus of Christians from the Middle East, a pattern that has been notable for some time but has accelerated with recent conflicts. Israel has operate as a haven for Middle Eastern Jews (and Russian Jews and now French Jews). Lebanon failed to operate as a similar haven for Middle Eastern Christians.
ISIS fighters in Iraq.

Nor would border re-arrangements solve the difficulties Islam has generating high trust polities. The traditional monarchies do comparatively well while Tunisia is a lonely Arab Spring (or is that Sunni Surge?) democratic success. But traditional monarchies can hardly be created ex nihilo and Tunisia has some rather specific advantages.

Relying on successful authoritarians to maintain peace and order in the Middle East was and is an entirely understandable temptation. Even more so when we contemplate what can follow the collapse or retreat of such rule (either disorder and chaos--as in Syria, Iraq and Libya--or mosque-rule--as in Iran--or the former from the attempt to get the latter--as in the Algerian Civil War) in a region which remains (outside the traditional monarchies) largely suspended between mosque and military.

But the authoritarians were never a solution (in the words of a famous essay of the same name the Shah always falls), just a holding action.  The trouble is precisely that groups such as ISIS and the Taliban are modern versions of recurring patterns that go back to the origins of Islam. Perhaps there is no solution, just various stages of the cycle: no better strategy than holding on until demographic collapse overtakes Islam. (Though that may make for even grander jihadism of desperation.)


[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Saturday, August 2, 2014

Enlightenment foreclosed?

Uttering the cliche that "what Islam needs is a Reformation" merely shows that the speaker understands neither Islam nor the Reformation.

The Protestant Reformation was the rejection of traditional accretions in favour of the authority of scripture; an attempt to return to "original" Christianity. Islam has experienced waves of such reformism throughout its history, also based on the authority of scripture and seeking to return to "original" Islam. (To understand Islam, you need to understand its history; A History of Islamic Societies by Ira Lapidus is an excellent starting point.)

The Reformation saw a dramatic upsurge in religiously-motivated violence in both scale and intensity. Even in its very earliest periods, Islam was wracked by assassinations and civil wars while the current period is marked precisely by an upsurge in religiously-motivated violence. Again, what is problematic about contemporary Islam is what is more like the Reformation not less.

Indeed, the most fundamentalist Protestant understanding of the nature and authority of Scripture is a pale shadow of the status and authority mainstream Sunni Islam puts on the Quran. Cristian fundamentalism says that the Bible is the inerrant word of God, but the word of God situated in time and mediated through inspired individuals. Thus, the Gospel of Luke is Luke reporting the word of God.

The eternal word
The mainstream Sunni interpretation of the Quran is that it is eternal--not created in time at all--and is the direct word of God mediated by nothing. This gives the Quran a standing and authority which far surpasses what even the most avid Christian fundamentalist gives scripture. Indeed, the hadith are more like the Christian understanding of scripture than is the mainstream Sunni understanding of the Quran.

This mainstream Sunni interpretation of the Quran arose out of the Mu'tazilite v Asharite debates of the C8th to C10th. (A useful discussion of which is provided here.) The effect of the (winning) Asharite understanding was to restrain the power of the Caliph, the ruler, as it put the Quran beyond the human and so left religious understanding--and, indeed, law--in the hands of the community of scholars (the ulama) and the Muslim community generally (the ummah); not any individual, no matter how elevated. The Quran was utterly above any human authority and so study of it provided access to an authority which trumped any (other) authority. The notion that democracy is blasphemous because it puts law-making authority in the hands of mere people flows from this outlook.

Al Ghazali
Al Ghazali  (c.1058-1111)
It was, however, a classic case of ideas having consequences, since the debate was about the standing of reason and revelation. The winning Asharite interpretation put revelation absolutely above reason and the unfettered Will of God as the grounding of everything. Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (c.1058-1111) or al Ghazali put together what became the overwhelmingly dominant synthesis within the Sunni mainstream which essentially elevated jurisprudence (the rules established by the Will of God and adherence to which marks submission to the Will of God) as the form of Islamic religious reasoning.

Al Ghazali's synthesis was rebutted by Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad bin ʾAḥmad bin Rued (1126-1198) or Averroes, but the rebuttal had effectively no influence within Islam. Averroes's Aristotelianism did, however, have a great deal of influence within Latin Christendom (Aquinas referred to Aristotle as "the Philosopher" and Averroes as "the Commentator"). The Islamic debate over reason and revelation was largely a debate over incorporating not merely the techniques (which al Ghazali happily used) but the understandings of Greek philosophy within Islam.

Enlightenment foreclosed
What folk are trying to say when they say "Islam needs a Reformation" is "what Islam needs is the Enlightenment reaction to the Reformation". That reaction being to dethrone political theology as the dominant forms of justification and legitimation, to put religion in a box and to turn the relationship between people and the world (and between people) into the source of justification and legitimation.

Well, yes, but the Enlightenment did not come out of nowhere. It was built in part on the Scientific Revolution and in part was yet another round of wrestling with the Classical heritage. (Not that these two things were mutually exclusive: if Lucio Russo is correct, the Scientific Revolution was partly the rediscovery of the Hellenistic Scientific Revolution.)

Which puts the Enlightenment well within the recurring patterns of Latin Christendom-cum-Western Civilisation of periodic upsurges in wrestling with said heritage--as in the Carolingian Renaissance, the Renaissance of the C12thThe Renaissance. All of which were based on the notion that said heritage had standing and authority.

Which is exactly what al Ghazali's synthesis denied. It was fine to use the techniques of Greek philosophy (and logic and mathematics) but only within, and at the service of, revelation.

Enlightenment possibilities
Latin Christendom and Judaism also had very similar debates over Aristotelianism, reason and revelation as did Islam, but in each of their cases, the great synthesiser--Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) for Latin Christendom, Mosheh ben Maimon or Maimonides (1125-1204) for Judaism--upheld Aristotelianism and provided a marriage of reason and revelation. Faith, but not without reason.

Maimonides
Maimonides (1125-1204)
Neither synthesiser did so without controversy and resistance from fellow believers. There were budding al Ghazali's within both Latin Christendom and Judaism; the temptation to place revelation uber alles is inherent in monotheism. Both Judaism and Christianity, however, had factors mitigating against the temptation. The permanent minority status of the Jews likely helped to entrench a perspective about limits built into the nature of things.

Aquinas was assisted by Christ acknowledging secular authority ("render unto Caesar"), that Paul of Tarsus used natural law reasoning along with a history of interpreting scripture within the limits of wider truth (given that scripture was the indirect creation of God but the world was His direct creation). So being born before Christ was an excuse for not following the Christian understanding of God as revelation was an unfolding process located in time.

All of which were products of Christianity starting its existence as a powerless, minority religion which was required to argue its case for centuries before achieving secular power. For both Judaism and Latin Christendom, law-with-authority which was not religious law was an established fact of life. The Catholic/Orthodox understanding of scripture as the product of the Church (understood as the community of believers) is a world away from the mainstream Sunni understanding of the Quran.

Islam, by contrast, went straight from revelation to political power to empire within a single lifetime. (The Muslim calendar dates from Muhammad's flight to Medina, so his achievement of political power.) Muslim authority came from submission to God. To elevate revelation was to elevate the community of believers (the ummah) over non-believers and religious scholars (the ulama) over other sources of authority. Appealing to collective egoism (even narcissism) has considerable appeal. Moreover, law was religious law. Certainly there were rulers, but their status was always somewhat dubious--they typically claimed to be agents of the (or later a) caliph. And those rulers (even the caliph) were not law-givers in the normal sense--their decrees were more like by-laws, operating as strictly subordinate to Sharia.

Moreover, since the Quran was outside time, there was never any excuse for failing to be Muslim. There had only ever been one Revelation, the Jews and Christians had willfully misconstrued it.

Revealed authority
Revelation was central to the operation of authority within Islamic societies far more profoundly than in Jewish communities subject to the authority of outsiders or in Christian states where law, even canon law, was a human construction.

For Asharite thinkers, putting any limits on Allah, on God, was to limit His utterly transcendent nature and authority. Even the limit of working through inherent structures in the world. Al Ghazali denied that there was any causality beyond the Will of God; Allah remade the world at every moment, and could do so any way He wished.

It is hard to have a Scientific Revolution if causality is merely the Will of God, which it is blasphemous to put any structure upon. The best science can hope to do is to describe God's habits so far.

While Islamic science did not entirely die once al Ghazali's synthesis became dominant, it did become something of a pale shadow of its former self. Apart from the metaphysical difficulties, if one was intellectually inclined, it was safer and easier to apply oneself to religious learning. Especially as there was status and income to be had as an interpreter of Sharia.

Aquinas
Aquinas (1225-1274)
For Islam to go through its own Enlightenment, the problem is finding a way in in to unpick the straightjacket of revelation and capricious divine will. Mainstream Christianity accepted that God was, in effect, a constitutional monarch who created via fundamental structures. That something was not Good because God did it, but that God did it because it was Good. The nature of things, including the nature of morality, of law, of political authority, had existence outside of revelation and God's Will--for even God's Will operated according to patterns and structures.

Conversely, al Ghazali's synthesis said that whatever God did was Good, that there is no Good to investigate outside of what God chooses to Will. Just as there was no structure to the universe outside of what God happens to decide from moment to moment. Hence justification and legitimation can only be grounded in revelation. Where is the way in for any other understanding of the role of religion and legitimate authority?

Been there, done that
Islam has a recurring pattern of struggles between reformers--who want to go back to the only source of real authority, the C7th revelations at the heart of Islam--and modernisers--who want to incorporate the insights of outsiders. The Mu'tzalites were modernisers just as the Islamists and jihadis of our time are reformers.

Generally, the modernisers lose. The insights of outsiders are, after all, infidel insights. To give them standing over Islam itself is to undermine the status of the Muslim community, the ummah, and the authority of the ulama, the gatekeepers of righteousness.

Social scientists talk about things being path dependent. Islam is gripped by powerful path dependence.

As Islam grapples with the modern world, it is foolish to underestimate how fraught that is. What Islam needs is not yet-another-Reformation; they have had far too many of those and those who want yet another Islamic Reformation are precisely the problem. What Islam needs is its own Aquinas or Maimonedes. A thinker or thinkers who can create a synthesis that can provide a way in for avenues of authority and understanding which are not bound by C7th revelations deemed to be outside time and so utterly superior to, and unbound by, anything within it. (Aquinas lived in the C13th of the Christian era; we are currently in the C15th--the year 1434 AH--of the Islamic era, so they are perhaps overdue.)

Islam does not merely need its own Enlightenment, it needs its own synthesising precursor of such, so an Enlightenment within the civilisation of Islam is possible. With added difficulty that holders of religious authority in Islam know precisely where that led for Christendom and Judaism and many of them are perfectly happy to recommend killing anyone who defies God's authority (and therefore their own).

Islamic clerics can appeal to the egoism and collective narcissism of their congregations (where collective convenience really is the shared reality principle; that tends to be self-policing). Conversely, any putative Aquinas or Maimonedes has to sell humility. That there is some legitimacy to infidel success and perspectives. Not exactly an even sell.

[Previously posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Friday, August 1, 2014

Unhelpful dichotomies

I recently finished The Creation of Inequality: How Our Prehistoric Ancestors Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery, and Empire by Kent Flannery & Joyce Marcus, a very accessible rendering for the lay audience of a huge amount of anthropological and archaeological data about the development of state societies. At the end of Chapter Twenty-Two ("Graft and Imperialism"), there is the following comment:
The rarity of laissez-faire market systems in early civilizations has fueled a long-standing debate among two kinds of economists: formalists and substantivists. Formalists believe that the laws of supply and demand usually determine what societies do. Substantivists, as exemplified by economic historian Karl Polanyi, believe that, on the contrary, the economy is embedded in society and constitutes a special form of social relations. Indeed, many substantivists would argue that economics began with the reciprocal gifts exchanged by hunters and gatherers and grew from there. ...
Perhaps the best way to leave the debate is this: Substantivists can cite dozens of anecdotal cases in which cosmology, religion or cultural values restrict the interaction of supply and demand. The formalists, however, have produced all the sexy equations that might win you a Nobel Prize.
Apart from displaying the Nobel-envy of economics which is widespread among other social sciences, this is not a helpful way of thinking about such matters. Adam Smith, for example, believed that economic relations were embedded in society, but also held that analysis of supply and demand could get you a long way. Yes, there is a strong tendency and temptation towards narrow formalism in mainstream economics. But there is a wide range of mainstream economic opinion between the polarised dichotomies set out above. 

What do you mean
Part of the problem is in that monumentally unhelpful construction laissez faire market systems. What does one mean by "laissez faire". No regulation? Minimal regulation? Regulation of what? What does one mean by "market system"? Does there have to be a market system for there to be markets? (Well, no.)

The simplistic dichotomy rests on a now-backwards conceptual framework, where rhetoric from modern ideological struggles is invoked to create a simplistic analytical dichotomy. Yes, it is perfectly possible to find economic analysis which way over-simplifies--to a very misleading extent--the complexities of the past (Carl Menger on barter and money, for example). But the implied exorcism of anything resembling mainstream economic analysis as a useful tool in historical analysis is not a good way of advancing understanding of the past. 

It is striking, for example, how many of the cited anecdotes turn out to be ways of dealing with risk, particularly variability in output. I would not, for example, characterise the internal economics of foraging bands as:
... reciprocal gifts exchanged by hunters and gatherers ...
Admittedly, it is unclear whether the reference is to interactions within or between foraging bands. But, as the author's themselves note in an earlier chapter, pooling hunted meat is an effective way of dealing with the high variability of hunting. Similarly, the reference to the development of a fixed price for copper in a particular set of long-distance trade arrangements strikes me, not as a "refutation" of supply-and-demand analysis, but as a risk-management device. Which, indeed, is what the author's suggest it was. Adding in the risk-dimension enriches supply-and-demand analysis, it does not abolish it.

Harold Demsetz's classic article on the development of property rights (pdf) makes it perfectly clear that social constraints will affect the weight given to particular problems and solutions. But his discussion of how property rights develop in response to changing possibilities and constraints is entirely compatible with the two authors's discussion of how Mesopotamia seems to have developed the first private ownership of land. (Said discussion somewhat punctures the presentation of Mesopotamian economies in David Graeber's Debt: The First 5,000 Years.)

Having previously done considerable reading on the economics of marriage, one of the pleasures of reading The Creation of Inequality is that the narrative provides very helpful explanatory context for concepts and conclusions in the economic papers discussing family forms. A case of archaeology, anthropology and economics all providing mutually supporting enlightenment. But, then, the aforementioned economic papers took the anthropological data as their starting point, so that is less than surprising.

Come Romanticise with me
Which gets back to the real problem--theorising poorly grounded in the empirical evidence. Often for reasons of ideological comfort. The authors's citation of Karl Polanyi is particularly apposite, since Polanyi seems to appeal in direct correlation to both ideological affinity and empirical ignorance. As Deidre McCloskey points out:
Yet when Appleby thinks a little about earlier economies, outside her specialty, she turns Polanyist. Everyone tends to, because, to repeat, Polanyi gives expression to the nineteenth-century Romantic story on which we all were raised. We all revert to fairytales when we get beyond what we actually know, especially when the tales seem to support what we believe fervently to be politically true. It’s human nature, or social psychology, or ideology, or rhetoric. We adopt stereotypes about women or black people or medieval peasants or robber barons just when we actually don’t know much about them.
The trouble with Polanyi is that he was half right, and wholly appealing:
Some very perceptive scholars have fallen for Polanyi, because a big part of what he says — that ideology and rhetoric matter — is so obviously true and important. Therefore they have believed the rest of what he says — that societies were not organized by markets until the nineteenth century. The emotional pattern seems to be something like, “Polanyi, a leftist like me, says many true things, beautifully. Therefore his tales about what happened in economic history must be true.”
Part of the problem is the dreadful term capitalism.  The term capitalism is like feudalism--it is an analytical black hole from which the complexities of actual history rarely escape. People create an "ideal type" of the "system" and then impose it on a much more complicated historical reality.

Markets, markets, all over the place
Markets turn up very early. Some civilisations (Mesopotamia, the Aztecs) used markets a lot. Some (Pharaonic Egypt, the Incas) ran something more like command economies. But even they had local markets. (Somewhat like modern command economies had black markets, except that the rulers of the ancient economies were not hubristic enough to think that all markets had to be replaced.) Once flows of goods and services get too complicated to be handled by personal connections, markets will arise. 

Both Macfarlane (The Origins of English Individualism) and Braudel (in his three volume Civilization and Capitalism) attempted to find that time when England was not a land of individualist property-owners engaging in truck, barter and exchange and could not find such a time. Which, if you look at various social mechanisms as operating on continuums of reliance, is not terribly surprising. The geography and institutional history of England militates strongly against the creation of early command economies or overwhelming reliance on personal connection.

About money
Another unhelpful dichotomy, though one rather more soundly grounded in actual analytical patterns than the above, is what economist Bruce Goodhart calls (actually rather helpfully) C-theory and M-theory (pdf) on the origins and nature of money. A lot of the problem here is the difficulties of what we mean by money. To start with, should we think of it as a thing, a noun--something is, or is not, money--or should we think of it as an adjective, a quality--things have varying degrees of moneyness? In a strict analytical sense, the latter. Alas, the money we use all the time pulls us much more naturally to think of it as a thing.
Most widely used form of money, across space and time.

The reason why Goodhart's term C-theory is helpful, is because it we take the strict chartalist notion that "money is a creation of law" (or worse, the state), then we are wrong from the start. Things which can clearly be described as money (or having a high degree of moneyness) arise in non-state societies and operate across jurisdictional boundaries. But if we take note of the network characteristics of money, then C-theory is not without its insights. It is just not remotely the whole story, for which M-theory also has to be utilised.

In both cases, the problem is that thinking of social phenomena as operating in continuums is messy and ideologically unhelpful. We like our dichotomies, they are rhetorically and analytically much more comforting. But, alas, comfort is not truth.


[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Tuesday, July 22, 2014

Short observations 3

A wonderful takedown  (via) of Love, Actually (by someone who enjoys the film). The suggestion that the characters are all emotional 15 year olds may also have some merit.

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On the Kindle-highlights measure, Thomas Piketty's tome on inequality, Capital in the C21stlooks like outdoing Stephen Hawking's A Brief History of Time as the great unread book of our time.

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Factory farming has expanded its possibilities as the Japanese create a lettuce factory (via). Energy, rather than land, is the constraint in such food production.

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Nice post on the effect of the 1997 Asian crisis on housing price booms in the US. Given that land rationing restricted supply responses in many housing markets, and rising price for a class of asset is a signal for an asset to be a good investment, the point that capital was sucked in to housing rather than more productive investments has even more force.

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The US is the dominant global military power, but seems to be rather better at making friends than China, or Russia, especially in Asia. According to this consideration of recent Pew global survey (pdf) data, folk in India, Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Bangladesh all see the US as an ally, and someone else as a threat. (Except Indonesians, who see the US as both.) It is probably not accidental that the Pakistan and Malaysia, where opinion sees the US as a threat, are both Muslim countries, or that Muslim Indonesia is mixed in views of the US.

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The fuss over the US Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby decision (pdf), which Alan Dershowitz dismissed as (legally) "monumentally insignificant", is nicely dissected here, based on Megan McArdle's rather longer post.  Folk who do not get that religion matters are probably not the sort of folk who are going to understand the Middle East.

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An apparent attempt to unilaterally impose an aspect of Sharia in Philadelphia.

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Michael J Totten provides an excellent survey of the Arab Spring (aka "the Sunni Surge") and how and why each country was different--in happenings and outcomes.

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Anti-prostitute "activists" slaughter 30 people, including 28 women, in an up-market area of Baghdad (via). The conjunction of religion and homicide for patrilineally controlled fertility.

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ISIS split off from al-Qaeda before its current surge into Iraq. That the jihadists have split is not necessarily good news: it may just mean accelerated competitive evolution to being more dangerous.

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ISIS is offering Christians the traditional Islamic choice--convert, pay extra tax or die. In the words of their announcement:
We offer them three choices: Islam; the dhimma contract - involving payment of jizya; if they refuse this they will have nothing but the sword.
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ISIS is using the prospect of killing Jews as a recruitment tool (via). Jew-hatred in the contemporary Middle East has much the same roots as Jew-hatred in C19th and C20th Europe--scapegoating angst over modernity built on traditional religious prejudice. So, there is real, if grim, symmetry in hoping for a new Holocaust. Even if Jews have mostly fled from Middle Eastern Muslim countries.

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Perhaps Greater Israel is the new reality. Arafat's failure to agree, or even make a serious counter-offer, at the 2000 Camp David summit looks like even more of a disaster for Palestinians than it did at the time. But, in a way, the failure of Ehud Barak's offer may also have been something of a moral disaster for Israel.