The entire debate over immigration, particularly illegal immigration, turns on the issue of social order -- specifically, its value and cohesiveness. Those who think there is simply no issue -- that no people who make the effort to go to another country to live can be a threat to the social order they are entering, no matter what their numbers or characteristics -- thus see immigration (legal or otherwise) as a very simple moral issue. People have a right to live where they wish and societies should willingly accept anyone who wants to live there. The worse the conditions or dangers they are fleeing, the more that is so.
a social order issue. If confronted with such concerns, they are either uncomprehending, dismissive or hostile. They posit -- without apparently noticing that they are doing so -- that the receiving societies are unproblematically adaptable to any particular influx, no matter what the scale.
Not accepting concern about any effect on social order as valid, it is then easy to "read" raising such concerns as oppressive (racist, xenophobic, etc). This is the
issue, where progressives see blocking migrants as oppressive, while libertarians see it as coercive.
Conservatives, by contrast, have social order concerns at the centre of their political worldview. So they tend to read tolerance for illegal immigration in particular as either deliberately subversive or stupidly naive.
(And there is a line of thought which takes the view that any harm done to the host societies is well-deserved; what is rather
nicely labelled ethno-masochism. As the new arrivals would likely also be negatively affected by such increased dysfunction, it is an attitude based on deep despite, not genuine concern for others.)
De-legitimising debate
Given that journalists and academics and related professions are strongly progressivist in their ideological outlook, and (
based on US evidence) remarkably homogeneously so, there is a serious problem if even
raising concerns about immigration is regarded as illegitimate. If wanting less immigration, or wanting to discuss selection criteria for migrants, is "anti-migrant", "xenophobic", "racist" etc, then it is not possible to have a free and open debate about immigration.
Which, of course, may be the point of the exercise -- the notion that "our moral project is so important that dissent is wicked" is a view that is clearly alive and well: that this "error has no rights" view is one of the key premises of
totalitarianism either does not strike such folk or they don't care.
A comment on the Via Meadia blog expresses the use of terminology to try and close down debate
nicely:
Take "anti-immigrant," for example. We hear that a lot. What, exactly, does it mean? As far as I can tell, its popular political meaning is this: anyone who suggests fewer immigrants be let into one's country, no matter what reason they give, is automatically "anti-immigrant." So the "debate" never even gets started because there can be no debating someone who is "anti-immigrant," right? Another is xenophobia. This is a favorite because it has overtones of erudition, being a Greek word and all. So if one is concerned about hundred of thousands, millions or tens of millions of immigrants from vastly different cultures entering one's country, one therefore fears strangers?
Such de-legitimising also means cutting out of the debate anyone with such concerns or views. The narrowing of debate has become increasingly pervasive. Thus, I could not post the picture opposite on Facebook(tm): apparently
any negative reflection on refugees is
verboten.
As being concerned about, sceptical of, etc to immigration turns out to be large proportions of electorates, such pressure to narrow debate becomes a serious problem for the health of democracy. And if mainstream politics will not address the concerns of significant numbers of voters, then that provides an opportunity for less (or non-) mainstream politics to do so. What I called
in my previous post the "angry voter" effect.
Immigration policy provides an opportunity for a large-scale use of
the Curley effect, whereby one seeks to bring in migrants expected to vote for you -- it
has been suggested that the former British Labour Government
had such a strategy. An effect which is increased if one also drives out people
not expected to vote for you. (The effect is named after
a Mayor of Boston who encouraged rich Protestants to leave while mobilising poor Irish Catholics.) Leaving aside the moral issues, the
operational trouble with any such policy on a national scale is that migrants take a while to become voters, so there is the danger of driving up the "angry vote" quicker than you increase your own.
The frustrated popular sentiments being captured by the Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump surges in US Presidential politics are nicely
expressed by conservative intellectual Yuval Lugan:
But in their different ways, they are actually pointing to some shared frustrations: Both Trump and Sanders are calling attention to those political debates in which the inherent cosmopolitanism of modern capitalism is most deeply in tension with the inherent populism of modern democracy—especially, but by no means exclusively, immigration and trade.
The Trump insurgence in particular is expressing
a populist frustration which is
also manifesting in such things as the surge in the
National Front in France, the
Sweden Democrats in Sweden, the
UKIP in the UK and so on. All tapping into notions among voters that
their government is supposed to be on
their side, looking out for
their interests.
Especially as the net benefits of immigration tend to be correlated with how much capital (including
human capital) one has -- that is, the benefits tend to be positively correlated with how much capital one is backed by, the costs negatively correlated (i.e. high capital folk tend to get most of the benefits, low capital folk most of the costs). [For example, a
recent paper (pdf) found that the
sudden arrival of largely unskilled immigrants from Cuba in 1980 seriously depressed the wages of those in Miami who had not completed high school for years afterwards.]
Thus the costs of immigration vary considerably among social groups. It is therefore not surprising that, in the UK, polling suggests that Labour voters
are quite hostile to immigration. The fear that immigration
can overstep popular tolerance is a perfectly reasonable one. Especially as the scale and rate of inflows matter. When, for example long time renters
start getting evicted to make way for refugees (and that in a country with relatively strongly responsive housing supply), it is not likely to help social acceptance.
But modern progressivists typically
don't socialise with those who disproportionately bear the costs of migration. As talking about such costs -- let alone considering the possibility they may vary with different
migrant groups -- becomes BadThink, the interests of those citizens who disproportionately bear the costs become themselves de-legitimatised. Instead, we see a tendency to sneer at such concerns from considerable social, and self-defined moral, distance. (Social distance that
has been increasing over time, at least in the US.)
Virtue signalling
Any highly moralised perspective that is dismissive of dissent is made for
Virtue signalling. Virtue signalling itself gets a great deal more power from maximising the wickedness of those who dissent -- who are then bullied with systematic attacks on their motives and moral character (something social media is made for). Such Virtue-signalling leads to the sort of mindset which is happy to negotiate with (or, at least consider the alleged grievances of) terrorists, but not with sinner fellow citizens sceptical about, or hostile to, the Virtue signal of endorsing the obvious and overwhelming urgency of letting refugees in. Besides, if much of the point of the exercise is to signal Virtue, then alienating lots of voters becomes a good thing -- it gives so many more folk to signal Virtue against. Thereby applying a basic principle of modern progressivist politics:
I am superior to you because I am more committed to equality than you.
Though being outraged at the notion that public debate should be wide enough to encompass the concerns of large numbers of fellow citizens does show a deep
not getting of what this democracy thing actually means. The EU is
currently demonstrating the difficulties of systematically excluding widely held concerns from normal democratic political bargaining.
The entire point of the flows of people into Western societies is precisely that Western societies are very successful societies; that is why folk want to live there. But valuing Western success is not a noticeable feature of the Virtuous mindset.
The ostentatiously Virtuous typically have no idea how narrow their moral vision is (nor how narrowly self-serving it is), blinded as they typically are by their own moral self-satisfaction and their (often deeply hypocritical) burblings about tolerance and diversity (which typically do
not extend to tolerance and diversity about divergent opinions or inconvenient concerns). It is one thing to argue the costs of large-scale migration are worth bearing -- it is quite another to treat any
discussion of such costs as illegitimate.
Much of Virtue signalling is based on ignoring or downplaying inconvenient facts. Which becomes even more of a problem if such cognitive blinkers seep into reporting, analysis and commentating because of high levels of moral conformity -- particularly Virtue-signalling conformity -- among journalists, academics and similar professions (thereby pushing reports of problems
into more rambunctious media). It is precisely such blinkering, and consequent intensifying of narrowness in perspective, which makes cognitive conformity
so dangerous for decision-making.
Gains from trade and other economies
Economists of an open borders bent point to the overall improvement in human welfare from migration, given that the income of people moving to the better organised (i.e. more productive) societies
will be raised--which is, of course, a major motivation for moving to such countries. Libertarian economist Bryan Caplan provides a
representative example of such enthusiasm for open borders.
The economist-libertarian argument about welfare gains due to moving to countries with higher productivity provides an example of gliding over social order concerns. Which is particularly easy for libertarians, who tend to take the view that social outcomes are state+private transactions, hence there is no problem from any level of migration because the state will continue to operate as before and there will be more
gains-from-trade private transactions.
If, by contrast, one takes a broader view of the importance of
social capital, and of
possible impacts on (pdf) the operation of the existing state, then the libertarian argument becomes rather less impressive. It is both funny and sad to read an open-borders enthusiast
wrestling with the idea that a billion entrants might change the US political system. The notion that entrants who have done nothing to show any commitment to the society they are resident in will follow the expectations and rules of their new society is hardly something to be just assumed. Especially if
no pressure is put on them to do so.
Democracy and rule of law -- particularly accepting different-but-equal and not nepotistically colonising institutions, to take two examples whose lack explains much about the contemporary Middle East -- are ideas and patterns of behaviour that folk have to be socialised into. (After all, helicopter-dropping democracy into Iraq, without dividing it into its constituent communities; that worked so well.) Such socialising requires a slow enough rate of immigration for it to occur; and the more divergent the patterns of behaviour and belief the originating societies are from the outlooks and behaviours that democracy and rule of law are based on, the slower the rate of immigration needs to be.
One of the remarkable features of the Virtuous mindset is that it holds that Western societies are seething with hateful thoughts and beliefs that desperately require laws against "hate speech", academic speech codes and institutional
codes of conduct; all to block, repress and transform said hateful thoughts and beliefs. Yet to suggest that there might be problematic patterns of belief and behaviour among actual or potential migrant groups is wicked BadThink.
But the point of Virtue signalling is to elevate one's status against one's fellow citizens and one's own society; neither of which Virtue signalling is served -- indeed both are undermined -- by critical examination of
non-Western patterns of belief and behaviour. So, non-Westerners become
moral mascots, to use Thomas Sowell's language, or
sacred victims, to use Jonathan Haidt's, and thus morally protected groups; critical consideration not allowed.
As Haidt points out, sacredness involves abandoning trade-offs. The sacred victims are not placed with other mere mortals within a web of trade-offs between moral principles, but elevated to a special moral purity such that critical examination itself becomes a sin against Virtue.
Fiscal costs and policy adjustments
There is an argument about the cost of immigration for welfare systems. In the US, poor immigrants seem to access welfare
at a lower rate than the locally born poor. But this is a pattern which will depend on national rules about eligibility and the make-up of immigrants. It becomes a potential issue if the increase in welfare expenditure from immigration is greater than the increase in revenue from increased economic activity from immigration: which does not seem to be a significant problem anywhere. But that is a fiscal cost argument which has no particular connection to social order concerns and which, in libertarian hands, is more likely to be an argument for scaling back welfare provision.
The libertarian case for open borders is typically also bound up in arguing for the necessary policy adjustments -- that labour markets be liberalised to encompass the new entrants, that land use regulation be liberalised to provide housing at reasonable prices and so on. The evidence is that such things are
not likely to occur. Indeed, one of the sectional advantages of immigration can be to drive up the value of existing houses in supply-constricted markets. Such immigration can also
make it easier to restrict the supply of housing for land, because a larger proportion of housing market entrants become new arrivals -- so non-voters -- skewing the electoral math even more towards market restriction and so creating "insiders" and "outsiders" (with migrants being "outsiders"). Nor is there any reason such a "more market entrants are non-voters so blocking market entry becomes electorally easier" dynamic could not operate in other markets.
Indeed, one sign that the Virtuous posturing on immigration is just that is that they can be relied on to oppose and denounce
any of the market liberalisations which would have to be enacted to enable reasonable economic participation by large numbers of new migrants. Just as they would oppose and denounce any attempt to have education systems encourage loyalty to the new country or anything resembling open and critical debate about what might or might not work well in the new social settings compared to what folk are fleeing from. [Yet acknowledging such an over-arching identity and focus of loyalty also provides
paths to integration for migrants.]
If the path to signally moral Virtue is taking a critical stance towards one's own society, not only does that mean ignoring its strengths but it also undermines any real incentive to minimise social dysfunction that does not directly affect folk like oneself, because such social dysfunction then provides more things to signal Virtue against. The pose among the Virtuous about being "subversive" is at least in part about preserving their sense of moral purity by not taking responsibility for anything unfortunate. Econblogger Noah Smith has coined the nice term of "
Haan history":
Injustice anywhere, under Haan thinking, invalidates justice everywhere else. ...
What matters is not just the flow of current injustice, but the stock of past injustices.
Haan presents a vision of stasis that is different from the Malthusian version. By focusing on the accumulated weight of history instead of the current situation, and by focusing on the injustices and atrocities and negative aspects of history, it asserts that the modern age, for all its comforts and liberties and sensitivity, is inherently wrong.